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ABSTRACT
Throughout the history of this nation, the United
States shipbuilding industry has played an important role,
evolving through the ebb and flow of economic circumstance,
world war and governmental activity. During the past
fifteen years, the shipbuilding industry has experienced many
changes, one of the most visible of which has been the wave
of conglomerate acquisitions of many shipyards and their
rise to dominance in the industry. The influence that this
has had on the industry is a controversial issue; however,
it is the purpose of this study to examine the shipbuilding
industry and some of the issues of conglomerate influence.
First, an analysis of the U.S. shipbuilding industry is
presented. The industry's history is reviewed in
perspective; the major governmental participants, policies,
and programs are identified and discussed; and the character
of the industry is analyzed relative to world shipbuilding
and relative to its distribution by major shipbuilders,
market sector, and types of vessel produced. Next is a
discussion of the development of conglomerates in the national
economy and, more specifically, within the U.S. shipbuilding
industry. Six major areas of conglomerate influence on
the shipbuilding industry are investigated: facility
expansion and modernization programs, organizational
structure, management philosophy and expertise, Navy
shipbuilding claims, power and influence, and financial
reporting. An extensive examination of the Navy shipbuilding
claims issue is presented because of the impact it has had
upon the major U.S. shipbuilding industry market sector.
Thesis Supervisor: Arnoldo C. Hax
Title: Professor of Management Science
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The United States shipbuilding industry has played a
long and important role in the development of America,
evolving from pre-revolutionary times, through the ebb
and flow of shipbuilding activitiy, world wars and
government legislation, to its present state. With it
has also developed the structure of American industry.
A recent movement in this development has been heightened
activity in large corporate mergers and acquisitions,
including a significant upsurge in conglomeration.
Largely due to this, the U.S. shipbuilding industry has
experienced many changes during the past fifteen years.
One of the most visible changes has been with the industry
corporate structure. Many of the previously independent
shipyards have merged with large corporations, most
notably the conglomerate acquisition of a number of
companies formerly totally devoted to shipbuilding. The
influence that this has had on the industry is a highly
controversial issue.
The objective of this study is to identify and
discuss the significance of the major influences of
conglomerates on the U.S. shipbuilding industry. However,
at the outset, certain limitations are set upon the scope
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to which the study will extend. First, the study is limited
to major shipyards capable of building Naval vessels, such
as destroyers, submarines and larger ships, and oceangoing
merchant vessels of 475 foot length and larger. This
definition is not peculiar to this study, but is consistent
with that for almost all of the literature data reported.
Secondly, the study is based upon data and resource
material which is generally available in the literature
rather than field trips, or confidential or proprietary
information from either the government or private industry.
This includes, primarily, government reports, Congressional
hearing recrods, shipbuilding industry and business
periodicals, and corporate annual reports. Although the
most recent available data is used, 1 January 1976 will
serve as the datum for general purposes. Thirdly,
although the Standard Industrial Code (SIC) for the
shipbuilding industry includes ship construction, repair
and conversion, the thrust of this study is ship new
construction. Ship repair and conversion activities
comprise an important part of the overall industry;
however, numerous small firms are engaged solely in these
activities and would serve to complicate the data without
sigificant benefit. Unless otherwise noted, data refer to




The approach of the study is to first analyze the
shipbuilding industry, reviewing in perspective its
history, identifying the major participants in the
industry and examining its basic character. This is
followed by a review of the nature of merger and
acquisition movements with emphasis upon conglomeration,
identification and discussion of the corporate and
conglomerate participants in the industry, and lastly,
identification and analysis of major influences of the




THE UNITED STATES SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Since the very founding of the United States of
America, the shipping and shipbuilding industries have
played important roles in the development of the American
economy and way of life. The wealth of post-revolutionary
America lay in its shipping and commerce. Americans were
a seafaring people whose courage and enterprise were
reinforced by economic advantages provided by a sympathetic
national administration. Governmental interest in the
maritime industries began with the second and third acts
of the First Congress which established lower duties on
certain imports when carried in ships of United States
citizens and imposed higher tonnage duties on foreign
vessels entering U.S. ports. In 1789, Congress provided
the first major stimulus to the infant shipbuilding industry
The act provided for registry of a United States flag
fleet, additional preferential taxes and duties, and,
most importantly, required that the U.S. flag vessels be
constructed in U.S. shipyards. Aided by such economic
policies, the shipbuilding industry continued to prosper
and grow so that in 1855 the American shipyards delivered
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over 2000 new ships, putting the privately-owned U.S. flag
fleet in a position to seriously challenge the United
Kingdom's traditional supremacy of the sea [33, p. 327].*
This period was one of the greatest in the history of the
U.S. shipbuilding industry.
The Civil War marked an end to the early growth of the
maritime industries. The U.S. flag fleet dwindled steadily
as owners transferred their ships to foreign registry in
order to avoid the Confederate raiders and exorbitant costs
for insurance. Also many were lost in battle. By the end
of the war, the U.S. flag fleet, which had been second only
to the United Kingdom, had lost 40% of its tonnage [33, p. 33]
In the years that followed, national economic
development was directed westward to the American frontier.
The American marine technology had lagged greatly behind
the Europeans who, as a consequence, enjoyed a sizeable cost
advantage over U.S. shipyards in producing newly-developed
steel-hull, steam-powered, propellor-driven ships. The
much higher shipbuilding costs and the concentration of
capital investment into railroads and westward expansion
left the U.S. maritime industries as extremely poor
investment opportunities. In an attempt to alleviate this
adverse situation, the government began a program of
Numbers in brackets indicate bibliography reference.
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subsidy through award of contracts for mail carrying to
owners whose ships could be converted to warships. This
program ended with the 1872 Pacific Mail Line scandal, which
only worsened the plight of the maritime industries. The
deterioration in both the shipping and shipbuilding
industries became manifest as the U.S. flag fleet, which had
carried in excess of two-thirds of the United States
waterborne foreign trade in 1860, fell to less than 10% in
1900 [53, p. 18] .
In the last years of the nineteenth century arose a
revitalization of interest in the shipbuilding industry.
This was brought about primarily due to four factors. First,
America had entered the period of its "Manifest Destiny"
in which new markets for industrial expansion were sought
in the unexploited regions of Central and South America and
the Far East. Such expansion would surely open numerous
new trade routes for the world merchant fleet and require
many new ships. Second, the Spanish-American War in 1898
demonstrated the severe shortage of U.S. supply and cargo
vessels as the Navy was forced to buy and lease numerous
foreign flag vessels. Third, a critical and costly
shortage of world shipping capacity resulted from the
withdrawal of many British merchant ships from foreign trade
for use in the Boer War (1899-1902). Lastly, even though
congressional attention was almost entirely directed
towards anti-trust action, in the first years of the

17
twentieth century, impetus for additional U.S. shipbuilding
resulted from congressional outrage at the severe dependence
of President Roosevelt's Great White Fleet on foreign
vessels in its 1908 world cruise attended by a motley array
of vessels bearing flags of the world [27, 30, 33, 58].
Political maneuvering and congressional study continued
until the outbreak of world war in 1916. Only minor
success was achieved in increasing the size of the U.S.
merchant fleet through legislation which provided for war
risk insurance, liberalizing of restrictions on registry
of foreign vessels and reduced customs duties on shipbuilding
materials, among others. In 1916, however, congressional
action changed forever the nature of the U.S. maritime
industries by bringing in a much more active participation
of government. With the outbreak of World War I, the
United States was faced with the problem of supplying
tonnage to replace that withdrawn by the belligerant
nations. Since the principal belligerants were also the
leading maritime countries of the world and since
American vessels carried less than 10% of our waterborne
commerce, the situation was quite serious. The Shipping
Act of 1916 was enacted to "establish a United States
Shipping Board for the purpose of encouraging, developing,
and creating a naval auxiliary and naval reserve and a
merchant marine to meet the requirements of the commerce
of the United States with its territories and possessions
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and with foreign countries; to regulate carriers by water
engaged in the foreign and interstate commerce of the
United States; and for other purposes" [58, p. 215]. It
was intended to equip a neutral United States to carry on
peacetime commerce in a war-torn world.
The Shipping Act of 1916 granted to the Shipping
Board broad powers in acquiring additional U.S. flag vessels
through purchase, lease, or construction. This included
the power to form corporations to operate vessels if
private operators could not be induced to take over
operations. The board was granted broad regulatory powers
concerning agreements between maritime business practices
and sale or disposal of vessels to U.S. citizens.
Additionally, basic provisions were included for wartime
maritime procedures.
The United States declared war only a few months after
the Shipping Board was actually organized; so their
peacetime intentions could not be realized. Instead, the
Shipping Board began a massive shipbuilding program to
provide wartime needs. This program was given further
impetus by the 1918 amendments to the Shipping Act of 1916
which prohibited the transfer to foreign registry of U.S.
vessels or the sale or lease of ships, shipyard or drydock
to foreigners in time of national emergency [40 Stat. Law
900]. The U.S. shipbuilding industry responded with its
greatest effort to that time, yielding 2312 new ships
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(13.6 million DWT) , quintupling the U.S. prewar tonnage and
raising the U.S. share of world fleet tonnage from less
than 7% in 1914 to over 22% in 1920 [53, p. 19, 33, p. 40,
58, p. 54] .
The U.S. shipbuilding industry had produced the
world's largest merchant marine; however, most of this
fleet was owned by the government, which had little or no
experience in operating commercial shipping. The act
establishing the Shipping Board limited its ownership of
ships to a period of the war plus five years, and provided
neither guidance for the transfer to private ownership nor
a policy for the peacetime role of the U.S. flag merchant
marine. These deficiencies were the aim of the Merchant
Marine Act of 1920— "an Act to provide for the promotion
and maintenance of the American Merchant Marine, to repeal
certain emergency legislation, and provide for the
disposition, regulation, and use of property acquired
thereunder" [41 Stat. Law 88] . It begins with the first
statement of national maritime policy, one which
essentially remains today.
That it is necessary for the national defense and for
the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce
that the United States shall have a merchant marine
of the best equipped most suitable types of vessels
sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce
and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in times of
war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and
operated privately by citizens of the United States;
and it is hereby declared to be the policy of the United
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States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and
encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine . . .
The Merchant Marine Act of 192 was intended to foster
development of the maritime industries without direct
government aid, even though providing indirect aids
through restoration and expansion of the cabotage laws.
Shortly after passage of this act, the shipping boom
collapsed and with it the government program to transfer
the U.S. flag fleet to private ownership. Sale prices of
Shipping Board vessels plunged as shipping managers, who
were generally under-capitalized, were reluctant to buy in
the face of the economic situation. Some efforts were made
to spur the shipbuilding industry and provide a source of
capital for shippers through legislation in 1924 [43 Stat.
Law 467] and 1927 [44 Stat. Law 1451] providing for a
construction loan fund. These measures were of only minor
impact
.
As concern mounted at the possibility that the U.S.
flag fleet might be forced out of foreign trade, serious
congressional debate culminated in the Merchant Marine
Act of 1928— "an Act to further develop an American merchant
marine, to assure its permanence in the transportation of
the foreign trade of the United States ..." [45 Stat.
Law 689] . Reaffirming the national maritime policy of the
1920 Act, it provided for restrictions on the sale of
Shipping Board vessels, encouragement of improvement and
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replacement of existing vessels, a broad and improved
construction loan fund, contract mail service for private
shippers, improved insurance programs, and required travel
of government officials on U.S. vessels. The primary
effects of the act were to permit continued government
ownership and operation of vessels and to provide a hidden
subsidy through the mail service contracts.
Despite the legislation, the U.S. flag fleet share of
the United States foreign trade continued to decline. From
the low of less than 10% (by value) in 1914 to the high
in excess of 51% in 1922, the share had fallen to less than
33% in 1933 [53, p. 18]. The United States possessed an
up-to-date merchant fleet in the early 1920s, but few
vessels were added thereafter. By the mid-1930s most of the
fleet was nearing the end of its useful life and could no
longer compete with the newer and faster foreign fleets.
Additionally, hearings and investigations into the performance
of the 1928 Act led to the conclusion that many of its
provisions, especially the mail-contracting provisions, were
ineffective, unworkable, or scandal-ridden. The congressional
dissatisfaction with the 1928 Act and a presidential call
for an end to disguised subsidies and a recommitment to a
national merchant marine brought about landmark legislation
in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 [27, 30, 58].
This act provided the first systematic peacetime
formulation of the government's maritime program. Although
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echoing the policy of the 1920 act, its methods were very
different. It was recognized that national interests
demanded an outright subsidy to the shipping and shipbuilding
industries. The primary features of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936 are: (1) establishment of a U.S. Maritime
Commission to consolidate administration of this act and
all other maritime acts in force and absorb the duties of
the Shipping Board and its Merchant Fleet Corporation; (2)
to adopt minimum manning and wage scales and reasonable
working conditions upon subsidized vessels; (3) to repeal
the ocean mail contract provisions of the Merchant Marine
Act of 1928; (4) to establish a construction-differential
subsidy program; (5) to establish an operating-differential
subsidy program; (6) to authorize the government to build
and charter vessels to commercial lines; and (7) to
establish a 500-ship, 10-year building program [58]. The
shipbuilding program proved to be invaluable as it provided
the impetus for the great expansion of the shipbuilding
industry necessary to satisfy the needs of World War II.
The effects of Wprld War II wrought devastation upon
all of the merchant fleets of the world; but, owing to the
incredible performance of the U.S. shipbuilding industry
in producing over 5000 ships (nearly 55 million DWT) , the
U.S. succeeded in quadrupling the size of the U.S. merchant
fleet (see Table 1). While in 1939 the U.S. fleet was the
world's second largest with slightly less than 14% of the
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Table 1— Number and Tonnage of Merchant Vessels Over
2000 Gross Tons Built in y.S. Shipyards Since
1914





1918 414 1 ,769,629
1919 723 3 ,369,884
1920 467 2 ,395,545





















1942 724 5 ,392,848
1943 1,661 12 ,485,629
1944 1,463 11 ,403,163











































Table 1 -- continued
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world's gross tonnage of major vessels (1,000 gross tons
and over) , in 1946 it had soared to nearly 51% of the
world's tonnage and easily the largest merchant fleet (see
Figure 2-1) . This period was truly the heyday in history
for the U.S. shipbuilding industry.
After the war had ended, the government began the
process of transferring the large fleet to private
ownership. Over 1100 vessels were sold for foreign registry
during the period 1945 to 1948 [9, p. 30]. At the same
time, U.S. buyers were given the opportunity to purchase
vessels at bargain prices through passage of the Merchant
Ship Sales Act of 1946. Under this act nearly 750 ships
were transferred to private U.S. ownership [9, p. 139].
Over 1400 remaining unpurchased and unneeded vessels were
laid up in the National Defense Reserve Fleet [58, p. 42].
The war produced no lasting benefit for either the
shipping or shipbuilding industries. Both continued a
steady decline until about 1970. The merchant fleet steadily
contracted (see Figure 2-2) , falling from the top five
world fleets by 1970. The U.S. fleet share of the United
States oceanborne foreign trade plunged from nearly 58%
in 1947 to less than 5% (by tonnage) in 1969 (see Figure
2-3)
. The shipbuilding industry also suffered a drastic
cutback in production. The reduction in demand for new
shipbuilding caused many shipyards to close. This situation











Fi/rure 2.3-- United States Oceanborne Foreign Commercial
Garp;o Carried




ship construction has declined from over fifty in 1947
to fifteen in 1970; however, other shipyards, such as
Litton and National Steel and Shipbuilding, have emerged
to become strong forces within the industry.
In contrast to the mounting obsolescence and
reduction of the United States flag fleet, the fleets of
other nations such as Great Britain, Japan, and Norway,
became progressively larger and faster and gained a
significant competitive advantage over the U.S. fleet. As
recently as 1970, the average age of the U.S. flag fleet
was 22 years as compared to 7 years for Japan and 11
years for the United Kingdom fleets. The trend indicated
an aging U.S. fleet while Japanese and United Kingdom
fleets were growing younger [47] . Additionally, the
foreign shipbuilding industries were rebuilt and modernized
It became evident that by 1980 the U.S. fleet would be
reduced to only about 200 ships able to carry less than
3% of the U.S. oceanborne foreign trade unless corrective
measures were promptly instituted. With this forecast,
the President announced a reaffirmation of the national
policy for a strong and modern merchant fleet and
efficient shipbuilding facilities expressed previously in
the Merchant Marine Acts of 1920 and 1936. A new maritime
program, providing government impetus to make the U.S.
maritime industries more competitive and to restore the
U.S. fleet to prominence, was embodied in the Merchant
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Marine Act of 1970. Its intent was to revitalize the
shipping and shipbuilding industries by providing for
construction of a large number of modern, highly productive
ships. The main features of this Act are [69, p. 1188, 47]
:
1. A program to rebuild the merchant fleet with ships
of advanced design with improved competitiveness to
be built with federal assistance over a ten-year
period. Emphasis is placed on development of ships
of standardized design and the introduction of series
production techniques.
2. Construction-differential subsidies to be paid
directly to the shipbuilder to encourage improved
design and efficient operations.
3. New contracting techniques such as negotiated
subsidy contracts and multi-year procurement.
4. All types of bulk carriers, for the first time,
are eligible for ODS and CDS aids.
5. A greatly expanded federal ship mortgage insurance
program designed to encourage more private financing
of new construction.
6. A new capital construction fund program allowing tax
deferrals of income for ship replacement.
7. Expanded and reoriented maritime administration
research and development program.
8. A descending scale of CDS rates set as the targeted
goal to challenge the shipbuilding industry to produce
ships at reduced costs.
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The period since 1970 has, for a number of reasons,
been one of paradox. There has been a drastic increase in
shipyard backlog levels from less than 2.2 million gross
tons (worth approximately $2.5 billion) of major merchant
and naval ships building or on order at the end of 1969
to nearly 5.3 million gross tons (worth approximately $9.6
billion) by the end of 1975, with a peacetime record high
backlog of over 5.7 million gross tons in 1975 [57].
Also, signs are that the steadily decreasing U.S. flag fleet
share of the U.S. oceanborne foreign trade may have been
checked and begun to rise slowly. These are coupled with a
continued narrowing of the cost gap between the U.S. and
foreign shipbuilders, for, although U.S. costs are continuing
to rise, foreign costs are increasing at a faster rate.
What seems to indicate a prospering U.S. shipbuilding
industry only tells half of the story, however. Even
though the past and present orderbooks are favorable, the
future is quite uncertain. Due to the Arab oil embargo
and subsequent skyrocketing price of oil, the market for
tanker shipbuilding has essentially collapsed. Additionally,
the effects of inflation in shipbuilders 1 costs have resulted
in severe financial losses on fixed-price contracts. The
market response to this situation has been the scrapping
and laying-up of older tankers and cancellation of numerous
shipbuilding contracts. In 1974, when troubles were
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beginning to mount, there were two tanker cancellations,
totalling nearly 33,000 gross tons. However, in 1975 the
situation has been much more severe, with twelve tanker
cancellations amounting to 544,800 gross tons [57]. As
shown in Figure 2-4, the number of new shipbuilding contracts
has also fallen off greatly in the past two years. In
1975 alone, the number of new contracts fell to less than
one-third of that for 197 4. With the prospects for new
building programs not encouraging, shipyard workload will
be the present, declining backlog; therefore, the future




Figure 2.4— Merchant and Naval Vessels (1000 gross or light



















MAJOR GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS AND POLICIES AFFECTING
THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
Throughout the historical development of the U.S.
shipbuilding industry has been woven the thread of
influential governmental programs and policies. The
maritime industries have been officially placed in national
priority since the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. The
national policy for encouraging the growth and maintenance
of the maritime industries has been reinforced and
modernized through further legislation to the recent 1970
Act. Through this policy, the federal government has acted
to influence and protect the state of both the shipping
and shipbuilding industries. The nature of this governmental
activity in the shipbuilding industry takes on the
proportions of not only the external-type governmental
relationship, but also that of a direct participant, for,
as will be observed, the federal government is by far the
single largest entity involved in the U.S. shipbuilding
market. Consequently, governmental policies and programs
dealing with the maritime industries in general, and the
shipbuilding industry in particular, will be of great




3.1 Major Governmental Agencies Involved
Due to the magnitude and diversity of government
involvement in the maritime industries, numerous
administrative agencies have been established over the years
to oversee particular government programs and legislation.
The Maritime Administration and the U.S. Navy are the
agencies of primary importance in administering shipbuilding
programs. These two primary agencies will be briefly
discussed, along with some others which, although of less
importance, exert important influences upon the shipbuilding
industry.
A. Maritime Administration (MarAd)
The Maritime Administration was established in 1950 as
an agency of the Department of Commerce to administer the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and related maritime
legislation. The chief executive of MarAd is appointed
by the President as an Assistant Secretary of the Department
of Commerce for Maritime Affairs. MarAd is responsible for
fostering the development of the U.S. merchant marine, built,
owned, and manned by U.S. citizens, capable of carrying the
U.S. domestic waterborne commerce as well as a substantial
portion of the foreign trade, and capable of serving as a
military auxiliary during times of national emergency. This
is the basic national maritime policy as set forth by the
Merchant Marine Acts of 1920, 1936, and 1970.

36
The primary MarAd impact upon the shipbuilding industry
derives from its administration of the construction-
differential subsidy program through its Maritime Subsidy
Board (MSB) . The Board is composed of the Assistant
Secretary, his Deputy and the MarAd General Counsel. The
function of the MSB is to administer the operating and
construction-differential subsidies via authority vested in
the Secretary of Commerce. It also conducts hearings and
investigations to determine the relative U.S. and foreign
costs of operating and constructing ships. MarAd also
administers other programs which are of more direct impact
upon the shipping industry, but still provide indirect aids
to the shipbuilding industry. These will be further
detailed in the next section. Other activities include
participation in international activities affecting U.S.
flag shipping, marketing programs to help U.S. operators
increase their participation in the carriage of U.S. foreign
trade, promotion of the development of efficient U.S. ports
and advanced intermodal transportation systems, training
of officers and crew to man American ships, and maintenance
of the National Defense Reserve Fleet [79, Section 1].
B. U.S. Navy
The Navy is an agency of the Department of Defense
headed by a civilian administrator appointed by the President
as the Secretary of the Navy. The Naval Sea Systems Command
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is the office within the Navy Department which is most
involved in Naval Shipbuilding. The Commander, Naval Sea
Systems Command, is designated as the coordinator of
shipbuilding, conversion, and repair for the Department of
Defense. Therefore, he is not only responsible for the
award and administration of contracts for the acquisition
and conversion of Navy ships, but also for procurement of
ships and boats for delivery to MSTS, Army and Air Force,
and foreign countries under mutual defense assistance
programs. The Commander is a Navy Vice Admiral and
headquartered in Washington, D.C.
C. U.S. Coast Guard
The Coast Guard is an agency within the Department of
Transportation that is headed by a Coast Guard Admiral
acting as Commandant. It is the primary maritime law
enforcement agency of the federal government. This along
with the Coast Guard shipbuilding program are the major
aspects which impact upon the U.S. shipbuilding industry.
The federal safety standards for U.S. flag vessels are
considered generally to be more stringent than those for
other nations. The responsibilities for inspection of
merchant vessels and their equipment lies with the Office
of Merchant Marine Safety, headed by a Coast Guard Rear
Admiral. Responsibilities for administration of Coast
Guard shipbuilding contracts falls to the Chief of
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Engineering, also a Rear Admiral. Both of these offices
report to the Commandant of the Coast Guard and are
headquartered in Washington, D.C.
D. Congressional Committees
Numerous Congressional committees deal in some way
with the myriad aspects of the U.S. shipbuilding industry.
Of primary importance, however, are two committees in the
House of Representatives and the Senate—the Committee on
Armed Services and the Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries. The impact of these committees lies in their
major roles in appropriations and maritime legislation
affecting naval and merchant shipbuilding programs. Within
the House Armed Services Committee, the Seapower Subcommittee
is very active in shipbuilding affairs, holding extensive
hearings covering nearly all aspects of U.S. shipbuilding
and publishing a detailed report, the most recent of which
is the Status of Shipyards-1974 . Of similar import is the
Merchant Marine Subcommittee of the Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee, whose primary involvement is in merchant
shipbuilding affairs as impacting upon the merchant marine.
E. Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS)
The MSTS is the part of the U.S. Navy which administers
the shipment of all waterborne military cargo. It operates
a nucleus fleet of merchant and converted naval vessels and
charters both private vessels and private companies to
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operate government-owned vessels as required to fulfill
the needed capacity.
F. Maritime Regulatory Agencies
Many independent federal agencies oversee and regulate
various aspects of the shipbuilding industry. The two of
most importance are the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC)
and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) . The FMC
regulates competitive practices of common carriers involved
in waterborne U.S. commerce and is separate and distinct
from MarAd. The ICC regulates rates and services of the
domestic maritime fleet.
3.2 Federal Aid Programs for the
Shipbuilding Industry
As with most other shipbuilding nations, the United
States has established federal programs and regulations to
provide economic advantages and protections for her maritime
industries. The government grants this public aid in order
to achieve certain political, economic, and military
objectives as in the philosophy of the national maritime
policy embodied in the Merchant Marine Acts of 1936 and
1970. The rationale offered as justification for such aids
to the U.S. maritime industries include: (1) the importance
of the maritime industries to the national security; (2) the
benefits of a prosperous merchant marine to the national
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balance of payments; (3) favorable employment effects of
additional jobs for Americans ashore and at sea; (4) the
promotion of U.S. commerce; and (5) national prestige [27
and 46] . It will not be the purpose of this study to
critically examine the validity or appropriateness of these
justifications. Numerous other studies presently available
provide in-depth analysis of the federal assistance programs
and provide alternatives for change felt appropriate by
various authors [2, 16, 27, 46 are examples]. Suffice it
to say that federal assistance to the maritime industries
is an important national priority, the primary rationale for
which appears to be national security.
The federal government has at its command numerous
means by which to provide assistance to the shipbuilding
and shipping industries. These means can be roughly classed
as either fiscal or non-fiscal in nature. Fiscal assistance
is rendered via the government's taxing or spending powers
and include such means as direct government subsidy programs,
preferential purchase of goods and services, and tax
advantages. Non-fiscal programs involve the exercise of
the government's regulatory powers and include the numerous
types of preferential legislation and priorities in national
policy. Most programs, however, will include both fiscal
and non-fiscal features. The first means, direct government
subsidy payments, seems to be the most prevalent throughout
world shipbuilding nations, and in the United States is
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surely the most visible, if not the most influential, type
of federal assistance program. Most of the U.S. aid
programs, whether fiscal or non-fiscal in nature, are
administered by the Maritime Administration.
The major federal assistance programs which impact
upon the U.S. shipbuilding industry will be discussed in
this section. They will be further classified as direct,
those whose primary purpose and effect are to directly
benefit the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and indirect, those
whose primary purpose and effect will directly benefit some
other sector, generally the shipping industry, but which
provide major incidental benefit to the shipbuilding industry
A. Direct Fiscal Programs
1. Construction-Differential Subsidy (CDS)
The construction-differential subsidy was established
by Title V of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and later
expanded by the amendments embodied in the Merchant Marine
Act of 1970. It is the only subsidy program which is
directed in its primary effect toward the shipbuilders, and
is probably the most important to the industry. In essence,
CDS permits a U.S. firm to construct a vessel in a U.S.
shipyard at a cost which is equivalent to that for
constructing the same vessel in a foreign shipyard. This
differential between the foreign and domestic building costs
is provided as an unrequited payment (subsidy) from the
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government directly to the shipbuilder. Aside from new
construction, under certain circumstances CDS may be paid
for reconstruction and reconditioning of existing vessels.
Because of the higher U.S. shipbuilding costs, the subsidy
is deemed necessary in order to place the U.S. shipbuilder
on par with foreign yards, and is intended to encourage
growth and maintenance of the U.S. maritime industries and,
thereby, to ensure a degree of national self-sufficiency
in these industries [75]
.
The actual amount of the CDS is calculated by the
Maritime Subsidy Board of MarAd. It determines the foreign
cost as an estimate of the building cost for the particular
type of vessel in a representative foreign shipbuilding
center chosen by the MSB. No such estimation is made for
the domestic building cost. Instead, the buyer
negotiates with shipyards for the price of the vessel to
be built. Then, either the purchaser or the U.S. builder
may apply to MarAd for the CDS. If the price is accepted,
MarAd pays the difference between the actual domestic price
and the estimated foreign cost as the construction subsidy.
No matter which party applies, the ultimate purchaser
is subject to the following general eligibility requirements
of Title V for the award of CDS [75]:
1. The prospective purchaser must be a U.S. citizen as
defined by the Shipping Act of 1916;
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2. The shipyard which will construct the ship must be
located in the United States;
3. The ship must be built for use in U.S. foreign
commerce;
4. The prospective buyer must have the necessary ability,
experience, financial resources and other qualifications
for the acquisition, operation, and maintenance of the
proposed new vessel;
5. The ship to be built must:
a. meet the requirements for U.S. foreign commerce,
be capable of aiding the promotion and development
of such commerce, and be suitable for use by the
U.S. for national defense or military purposes
in time of war or national emergency;
b. be documented under laws of the United States for
25 years (20 years for tankers and other liquid
bulk carriers)
;
c. be manned entirely by U.S. citizens; and
d. be operated in the U.S. foreign commerce (except
as provided in the Act) ; and
6. If the United States purchases or requisitions the
vessel, the owner shall be paid the depreciated
original construction cost or the scrap value,
whichever is greater.
By the amendments of the 1970 Act, future improved
domestic shipyard productivity was contemplated; therefore,
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the goal was set for progressive reductions in the maximum
CDS rate of 2% per fiscal year to a level of 35% in FY 1976.
This goal is a mandatory ceiling for negotiated contracts.
If the construction price is arrived at by competitive
bids, the maximum CDS rate is 50% as long as it does not
exceed the negotiated contract ceiling level. Additional
provisions have been made for payment of costs for "national
defense features." If the Navy recommends that certain
features be incorporated into a proposed CDS merchant vessel
in order to enhance its military value and MarAd determines
that these features are of no commercial use to the owner,
the entire cost of these items will be paid by the
government in addition to the CDS. A view of the historical
trends of the number of vessels under the MarAd CDS program
and the recent extent of the program can be derived from
Figure 3-1.
2. Preferential shipbuilding
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, also
required the Departments of the Navy and Commerce to annually
review the existing privately-owned shipyards capable of
merchant shipbuilding to determine if their capabilities
and capacities are sufficient for national defense
mobilization at strategic points in time of national
emergency. A means provided for correcting deficiencies
in this regard is the preferential award of
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government-sponsored or subsidized shipbuilding contracts
to deficient shipyards in the interest of national
security [70, p. 91]. Such action was taken in 1958,
when the Maritime Administration allocated contracts for
general cargo ships to National Steel and Todd (San Pedro)
to correct an apparent deficiency in the shipbuilding base
on the West Coast. No other allocations of MarAd ship
construction have been made since that time. The Act also
required annual reports on this subject, the most recent of
which is the "Annual Report on the Status of Shipbuilding
and Ship Repair Industry in the United States-19 75" prepared
by the Coordinator of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair,
DOD (who is also the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command)
.
B. Indirect fiscal programs
1. Operating-Differential Subsidy (OPS)
The operating-differential subsidy program was
established by Title VI of the Merchant Marine Act of 19 6.
As described earlier, this form of public assistance to the
merchant marine was adopted to replace other forms of direct
financial aid such as the scandal-ridden mail contract
program' of the 1928 Act. ODS is primarily oriented towards
the U.S. shipping industry, but provides indirect aid to
the U.S. shipbuilding industry through additional market
protections and encouraged shipbuilding in U.S. shipyards.
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ODS is paid to qualified U.S. flag vessel operators
for the operation of vessels in essential services in the
U.S. foreign commerce. Parallel to the CDS program, this
program seeks to place the U.S. flag operators on par with
their foreign competitors by equalizing the differential
in operating costs. Originally the program was limited
to the operation of liner services in the U.S. foreign
trade, but was broadened to include bulk carriers by the
1970 Act. The ODS program provides for "fair and
reasonable costs of wages for officers and crew,
insurance and maintenance and repairs not compensated by
insurance" in excess of the estimated cost of the same cost
items if the vessel was operated under the flag of a
substantial foreign competitor [77]. Additionally, MarAd
is authorized to pay a differential subsidy for any other
cost item whose higher U.S. cost puts the operator at a
substantial disadvantage with its foreign competitors or
whenever necessary to offset the effects of government
foreign aid [27, p. 20]. Other substantial cost items such
as stevedoring and fuel are not subsidized because both
foreign and U.S. operators face essentially the same costs
for these items. These unsubsidized costs represent roughly
60% of the total operating costs. The subsidy rates are
computed separately for each trade route based upon a
weighted average of the foreign competitors and vessels
comparable to those for which ODS is sought. The actual
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amount of the subsidy is then the product of the subsidy
rate and the subsidizable operating expenses [16, p. 45-50].
To be eligible for the ODS, an operator must:
1. be a United States citizen;
2. possess the ability, experience, and financial
resources to conduct the proposed operations in an
efficient and economical manner;
3. be willing to lease or purchase vessels in sufficient
number and type to maintain competitive service in
the proposed trade;
4. be financially capable to undertake a long-term
contract agreement with MarAd;
5. not operate any foreign flag vessels which compete
with an essential American flag service; and
6. not be engaged in domestic trade.
Vessels eligible for ODS include all modern types of
cargo-carrying ships whose designs are satisfactory for
operation in essential U.S. foreign trade. The ships must
be built in the U.S. and controlled and manned by U.S.
citizens. In return for the ODS, the operator accepts
certain contractual obligations such as maintenance of U.S.
citizenship, operation of the ships in an efficient and
economical manner, replacement of overage ships, refraining
from domestic or foreign-flag operations, and ship




The levels of annual ODS and CDS expenditures for the
past two decades are shown in Figure 3-2.
2. Capital Construction Fund (CCF)
The shipping industry is the primary beneficiary of
the tax subsidy form of federal financial aid which is
not granted to other U.S. industries. By these, various
types of funds are protected from tax; consequently, the
federal government subsidizes the shipowners' expenditures
for new vessels and equipment. In order to qualify for a
tax subsidy, the shipowners must buy from U.S. shipbuilders
and manufacturers; thus indirectly benefiting shipbuilders
through increased demand for their products.
The capital construction fund program was established
by the amendments to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936
embodied in the 1970 Act. The CCF replaced the capital
reserve funds that were required for subsidized operators
and other special reserve funds of the 1936 Act. Its
purpose is to provide a means to aid the shipowners in
accumulating the large amounts of capital needed to
properly modernize and expand the U.S. merchant fleet,
and it is administered, so far as the shipping industry
is concerned, by MarAd.
CCF program privileges are available not only to
operators engaged in U.S. foreign trade, but also to those
engaged in the Great Lakes and non-contiguous domestic





















































































































































































> > \ »—i i \ > i—> t \—> \ \ v \
—\—




1. be a U.S. citizen;
2. own or lease eligible vessels;
3. have a program which furthers the purposes of the
1970 Act and provides for the acquisition, construction,
or reconstruction of an eligible vessel; and
4. demonstrate the financial capabilities to accomplish
the program.
Eligible vessels are vessels constructed or reconstructed
and registered in the U.S. that operate in U.S. foreign or
domestic trade.
Basically, the fund is divided into three accounts,
depending upon the manner in which the funds would be taxed
if not deposited in the CCF. These are the capital account,
capital gain account, and the ordinary income account. The
CCF program provides for the deferral of federal income
taxes on certain deposits of money or property into the CCF
accounts. These deposits may be earnings from vessel
operations, net proceeds from sale, insurance or
indemnification for loss of a vessel, or earnings from
investment of deposited funds. The fund holder may then
periodically withdraw funds for the acquisition, construction,
or reconstruction of vessels built in the U.S., to repay




3. Federal ship financing program
The federal ship financing program is administered by
the Maritime Administration like almost all of the
significant federal maritime aid programs. It was
established under Title XI of the Merchant Marine Act of
1936 for the purpose of promoting the growth and
modernization of the U.S. Merchant Marine by issuing
guarantees of obligations to enable the financing and
refinancing of vessels constructed in the United States and
owned and operated by U.S. citizens. The program enables
the owners of eligible vessels to obtain long-term financing
on favorable terms and conditions and at interest rates
that are comparable to those available to large and
financially strong corporations. Direct government
financing of shipbuilding loans at low interest rates has
also been authorized by the Act, but has not been
appropriated by Congress in recent years; consequently,
the loan guarantee program has been necessary since such
favorable financing terms are usually not available to the
average shipbuilder. The actual funds are obtained from
the private sector [76]
.
For eligibility, the vessel must be greater than
gross tons, of a design with adequate engineering for its
intended use, American-built and -operated, and in ABS
class A-l. The owner must be a U.S. citizen, have




a sound, economical basis and satisfy certain financial
requirements. If the application for Title XI
financing is approved, the Secretary is authorized to
guarantee an obligation not to exceed 75% of the actual
cost of most eligible vessels. Exceptions permitting
guarantees up to 87.5% of the actual cost of construction
include ocean-going vessels greater than 2500 horsepower
capable of a 40-knot sustained speed and vessels greater
than 3500 gross tons capable of a 14-knot sustained
speed, among others for inland waterway use. The maximum
guarantee period is 25 years from date of delivery unless
extended due to reconstruction. Amortization in equal
payments of principal is usually required and the interest
rate of the obligation guaranteed must be within the range
of interest rates prevailing in the private market for
similar loans. Two fees are charged for the privilege of
using the federal ship financing program. A one-time
investigation fee of usually one-eighth of one percent
is charged for administrative preparations by MarAd and an
annual guarantee fee of between one-half and one percent
of the outstanding obligation per year. The funds are
used to maintain a revolving fund for the purpose of
underwriting the government guarantee and to pay expenses
of the program [76] . Figure 3-3 presents historical and
recent data for the federal ship financing program.
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Figure 3.3— Federal Ship Financing Guarantee Program
(Title XI) Expenditures






Cabotage laws are those laws which reserve the trade
along a nation's coast to ships of the national fleet. The
first U.S. cabotage laws were enacted through legislation
in 1817. These laws have been revised, modernized and
expanded through our history, and, except for a brief
hiatus during World War I, have continued in force to
this day. The current cabotage laws of the United States
are scattered about Title 46 of the U.S. Code. The most
direct reservation of the U.S. coastal trade for U.S. -built
vessels appears in the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (commonly
called the Jones Act) which, among other important sections,
re-established the cabotage laws following World War I.
The most important results of the cabotage laws are to
reserve U.S. coastal trade to vessels of domestic
construction; to reserve the transport of passengers between
U.S. ports to U.S. vessels; to ban the landing of foreign
fishing vessels or their catches in U.S. ports; to prohibit
foreign tugs from towing U.S. vessels or foreign salvors
from engaging in salvage operations in U.S. waters; and to
prohibit dredging of U.S. waters by foreign dredges. These
laws have also been expanded to include the nation's
territories and possessions [27, Chapter 5]. The benefits
to the shipbuilding industry are those to be derived from
protected markets and economic advantages for its merchant




Cargo preference laws are a very significant aid to the
U.S. shipping industry and benefit the shipbuilding industry
in an indirect manner resulting, again, from the
semi-protected shipping markets. As a body, the group of
federal statutes comprising the cargo preference laws
require that not less than a stated fraction of "government
cargoes," usually 50%, moving by sea in foreign commerce be
carried by U.S. vessels. The definition of "goverment
cargoes" is peculiar to the specific intent of each of the
particular laws. Three of the most important cargo
preference laws are the Military Transport Act of 1904,
Public Resolution 17 (1934) and the Cargo Preference Act
of 1954. The Military Transport Act of 1904 is the oldest
current preference law, and it requires that all shipments
of the U.S. armed services moving by sea must be carried
either by U.S. registry or U.S. -owned vessels. As was
previously mentioned, the MSTS is the predominant factor
involved. Public Resolution 17 of 1934 reserves all
Export-Import Banking-generated cargoes for U.S. -flag
vessels, although not having the force of law. The Cargo
Preference Act of 1954 is a widely inclusive act
requiring that at least 50% (>by tonnage) of all goods
bought by the government for its own use or for foreign
aid, or for which government credit or guarantee is
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involved, must be shipped in privately-owned U.S. -flag
vessels [27, Chapter 7].
3. MarAd shipyard R&D programs
Of direct impact upon the shipbuilding industry is the
MarAd shipyard R&D program, which is conducted at various
technical centers under the direction of shipbuilding
firms. Under the program, MarAd and the shipyards share
the cost of ongoing projects, but the shipyards are
responsible for the technical management of the projects,
planning of new projects, and assisting other U.S. yards
in implementation of project results. The major areas for
the R&D projects are welding, material handling systems,
outfitting and production aids, surface preparation and
coatings, computer aids in construction, production
management information systems, ship producibility and
shipbuilding automation [69, p. 1196-1200, 2]
.
4. Buy American Act
Title 41 of the U.S. Code, Section 10, requires that
"manufactured articles, materials and supplies which are
purchased for public use must be mined or produced in the
United States and only such manufactured articles,
materials, and supplies as have been manufactured in the
U.S. substantially all from articles, materials, and
supplies mined or produced in the U.S." This "Buy American"
policy has been particularly applied to MarAd assistance
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programs by Section 50 5 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936
which states that "in all such construction the
shipbuilder, subcontractors, materialmen or suppliers shall
use, so far as practicable, only articles, materials and
supplies of the growth, production or manufacture of the
United States as defined in paragraph K of Section 401 of the
Tariff Act of 1930." Therefore, MarAd programs such as
CDS, CCF and federal ship financing are subject to the
"Buy American" policy, except as specifically noted. As
far as naval ship construction is concerned, this policy
is directly applicable. Furthermore, amendments to the
Military Appropriations Bills of 1965 and 1968 require that
no major component of the hull or superstructure of a
naval vessel may be built in any foreign shipyard.
5. Nuclear Navy Bill
The House Armed Services Committee authorization
bill for FY 1975 states the following policy (Title VIII,
Section 801) :
It is the policy of the United States of America
to modernize the strike forces of the United States
Navy by the construction of nuclear-powered major
combatant vessels and to provide for an adequate
industrial base for the research, development, design,
construction, operation, and maintenance for such
vessels. New construction major combatant vessels
for the strike forces of the United States Navy
authorized subsequent to the date this Act becomes
law shall be nuclear-powered, except as provided
hereafter.
Strictly followed, this policy will have a great impact upon
the composition of future naval shipbuilding. This is
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especially the case in an environment of reduced funding
for naval ship acquisition, in which an emphasis on a
larger nuclear segment will drastically reduce the funds
available for non-nuclear shipbuilding. The impact of this
upon the shipbuilding industry will be manifest in the
higher concentration of naval shipbuilding in the two
shipyards capable of nuclear shipbuilding, Newport News
and Electric Boat Division, with less new contracts going
to other shipyards.
3.3 Naval Ship Acquisition Policies
Since World War II, the U.S. naval ship acquisition
policies have undergone great change. To date, three
distinct policies can be identified— the "conventional"
policy after the war and lasting until about 1961, the
"concept formulation/contract definition" policy of the era
of Defense Secretary McNamara from about 1962 to 1969,
and the present policy since 1970. The basic elements
of each of these policies differ significantly; however,
the basic process by which naval ships are procured has
not changed greatly. Basic to the process are the
initial identification of a need, the establishment of
requirements based upon that need, and the selection,
development, design and construction of a weapon system
to fulfill the requirements. The Navy is responsible for
identifying the need for a new weapon system and for
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defining, developing, and producing the systems to satisfy
the need. Establishment of overall acquisition policy,
validation of needs, and monitoring of the program
performance is the responsibility of the Secretary of
Defense.
In this section, each of the three major procurement
policies will be briefly discussed with particular
emphasis upon those characteristics which impacted upon
the shipbuilding industry and the results of that impact.
For a general overview, Table 2 presents a brief
comparative summary of the basic characteristics of
the acquisition policies. Throughout the following
discussion, it should be remembered that, even though the
three policies differ greatly, the time required from
design through contract to construction of a new naval
ship (often 10 to 15 years) prevents one from categorizing
a particular ship project as the result of strictly one
acquisition policy. It is possible, however, with this
understanding, to associate a ship project with the
major elements of the policies as in Table 3.
A. Conventional policy
At the end of World War II, the Navy had 5,000 ships,
and about 57 shipyards were working at or near capacity.
Since, both the Navy and the shipbuilding base have
continued to shrink. Much of the fleet was retired from
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active service, but later reactivated for the Korean
conflict; consequently, there was no major naval shipbuilding
program undertaken until about 1952.
The "conventional" policy was characterized by an
iterative design process accomplished by the Navy "in-house"
or by an independent design agent, little documentation,
major emphasis on ship performance, splitting of production
contracts between several shipbuilders, and little
involvement by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The acquisition process was basically decentralized to
the service level. In this period the Navy followed a
general policy of maintaining as large a shipbuilding
base as possible within budgetary constraints. The major
impact of this "conventional" policy was the allocation
of new shipbuilding contracts among the Navy's primary
warship builders (Todd, Bath, Bethlehem Steel, New York
Shipbuilding, Newport News, Electric Boat, Ingalls, Puget
Sound Drydock, National Steel, etc.) in order to achieve
a balanced distribution of the production. Additionally,
some new construction was performed in Naval shipyards
(Portsmouth and Mare Island for submarines, and
Philadelphia, Puget Sound, and New York for surface ships)
.
It is interesting to note that it was during this period
that MarAd exercised its authority through preferential
shipbuilding provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of
1936 and allocated ship construction contracts to two
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shipyards in order to correct West Coast deficiencies. No
such allocation has occurred since. Ships developed under
the "conventional" policy and their major producers are
shown in Table 3.
B. Concept formulation/contract definition policy (CF/CD)
In the early 1960s Defense Secretary McNamara
initiated major changes in the Naval ship acquisition
policies through implementation of concept formulation
and contract definition, leading eventually to total-package
procurement. The previous policy of allocation was laid
aside in favor of establishing the policy of formally-
advertised fixed-price bidding procedures for Navy ship
procurements. Only minimal attention was given to the
concept of a broad shipbuilding base being required
for mobilization purposes.
The radically different acquisition policy featured
centralized major decisionmaking authority to the Office
of the Secretary of Defense. The objectives of the new
program were [8]
:
1. optimization of cost effectiveness by using systems
analysis techniques;
2. reduction or elimination of contractor claims
against the government by using contractor-prepared
performance-oriented specifications instead of
government- imposed detailed specifications;
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3. reduction of cost overruns by transferring financial
risk to the contractors for the design and
acquisition phases through the use of fixed-price
contracts;
4. significant capitalization increases in shipbuilding
facilities by using multi-ship f multi-year contract
awards to a single shipbuilder that were expected
to provide long-term financial security; thus
enabling large-scale capitalization and forcing
expansion of facilities due to delivery schedule
demands;
5. reduction of unique system and subsystem proliferation
resulting from split production contracts;
6. introduction of producability and innovation into
the designs by having the production contractor
design the system he will produce;
7. lower acquisition costs by taking advantage of the
"Learning Curve" effect through single-producer,
serial productions; and
8. arrival at more accurate total cost estimates and
reduction of poor ship support by making the
contractor responsible for all on-board systems,
crew training, initial repair parts and support
facilities similar to "Total-Package" procurement.
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Under the CF/CD process, concept formulation remained
primarily a Navy in-house activity. It was the phase
for determining the requirements a ship would have to
satisfy and which of the requirements could be satisfied
by existing weapons systems or by new R&D projects. The
contract definition phase, however, provided the greatest
departure from the "conventional" policy. Where, in the
past, ship designs had been developed by the Navy in-house
and then negotiated with several shipbuilders for
construction, contract definition called for the Navy to
issue Requests for Proposals to selected capable
shipbuilders, the successful bidders of which (usually
two or three) were then paid to produce ship designs.
The construction contract was then awarded to the single
shipbuilder with the "best" design. ("Best" was primarily
the most cost-effective, i.e. the most performance per
life-cycle cost dollar coupled with the production
schedule.) The single contract thus awarded was for
multi-year, multi-ship, fixed-price production, with or
without incentive clauses. Ships developed under the
CF/CD policy, and their major producers, are shown in
Table 3.
This Navy CF/CD policy was an adaptation of the
Total-Package Procurement program in use throughout the
Department of Defense for all weapon systems acquisition,
and both developed severe difficulties. By the late
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1960s, cost and schedule overruns and performance shortfalls
of new major weapons systems were daily newspaper fare.
In 1971 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Financial
Management (comptroller) conducted a survey of 35 major
development and production programs, finding only two of
which to be on, or ahead of schedule [18] . The same year
GAO made a survey of 61 weapon systems and found the cost
estimates for them had increased $33.4 billion over the
initial estimate [18] . The first LHA is yet to be delivered
and is several years behind original schedule and millions
of dollars over estimate. Contractor costs soared,
profits plummeted, and claims against the government
mounted. The term "contractor bailout" became prevalent
as one producer after another threatened to cease
production unless relief from the fixed-price contracts
was provided.
For the Navy and the Naval shipbuilder, several
major drawbacks developed in the CF/CD policy. Large
amounts of money, time, and personnel were required of the
government and the shipbuilder in generating and evaluating
the competing ship design proposals. A significant
problem was the impact on shipbuilders who, after
submitting their proposal, had to be cautious when
competing for other business while waiting for the
contract award. This, and the significant cost and
uncertainty involved in employing a large design team to
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prepare a proposal, caused some shipbuilders to withdraw
from competing for Navy shipbuilding [67, p. 1-17]. Further,
the cost savings envisioned from more efficient series
production are not materializing. Inflation has been a
major contributor to the cost growth of recent contracts,
and this has been compounded by the inflation effects in
wages and material of the myriad subcontractors involved.
The result has been to only further narrow the already
limited shipbuilding base available for major naval
shipbuilding and to create an intense adversary relationship
between the Navy, Congress, and the shipbuilder, the
effect of which will be felt in Naval shipbuilding for
years to come.
In May of 1970, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard
announced that the Total Package Procurement policy was to
be replaced by a new policy soon to be established. It is
yet too early to evaluate the final results of the LHA and
DD-963 projects, so whether or not the long-term objectives
of the CF/CD Total Package Procurement policy will be
achieved for the Navy remains to be seen. It is a fact,
however, that the sole-source, multi-year contract
programs directly resulted in the construction of a new




The Navy ship acquisition policy now in effect strives
to combine the best features of the "conventional" policy
with the lessons learned from the CF/CD experience. At
this time, the major project concerned is the Guided
Missile Patrol Frigate (FFG) program. Major elements and
trends of this new policy include:
1. in-house ship design aided by some private
contractor involvement (from "conventional" plus
CF/CD)
;
2. rigorous, systematic approach with required review
and approval to proceed through the major
acquisition stages (from CF/CD)
;
3. no Total Package approach in that the design and
production phases are rigidly separate (from
"conventional")
;
4. formal documentation (from CF/CD);
5. improvement of the quality and validity of cost
estimates;
6. flexibility in contract type and liberalization
of escalation and inflation clause usage;
7. tailoring of acquisition approach to the needs of
each project;
8. emphasis on constrained design through the "Design
to Cost" approach; and
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9. emphasis on proven design and equipment through a
"f ly-before-you-buy" approach.
The last of these policy elements are the most
distinctive of the present approach. The "Design-to-Cost"
method was revolutionary to the Navy, but fairly commonplace
in private industry new-product development. The method
will be used for non-nuclear ship acquisition and
involves a period of identification and study of
alternative designs which are technically feasible for
satisfying the need requirement and estimation of their
gross characteristics using ship synthesis and engineering
analysis techniques. After this, design constraints are
established by Navy top management. In the FFG project
these initial design constraints concerned the acquisition
cost, full-load displacement, and crew size. Performance
capability above the minimum specified must then be
traded off to stay within the design constraints. Discrete
cost elements (i.e. g unit production cost, operating and
support costs) are then translated into "design to"
requirements. Design baseline cost goals are rigidly
reviewed throughout the design phases.
The key element which has grown from recognition
of the need for increased test and evaluation during
the acquisition process has been prototyping or "fly-before-
you buy." Total prototyping of major naval vessels is not
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feasible, however, due to the time and expense involved;
consequently, a modified approach has been used. This
involves early construction of land-based test sites to
evaluate entire systems such as the propulsion and combat
systems, and allowance of adequate time between the
various design and production phases to permit realization
of the design test and evaluation prerequisites.
The actual acquisition process has been exemplified
by the FFG program. In that program, two cost-plus-fixed-fee
(CPFF) contracts were awarded for private shipbuilders to
aid the Navy in ship system design. This mutual assistance
should benefit both the Navy and the shipbuilders through
more producable designs and reduced misunderstanding. One
shipyard, in this case Bath Iron Works, was then selected
to build the "lead" ship (the first ship to be built)
.
Separate lead-ship construction is begun well in advance
of follow-ship construction in order to validate the design
of the lead ship. After construction has been underway for
some time, follow-ship shipbuilders are selected on a
competitive basis with fixed-price incentive (FPI)
multi-year contracts to be awarded to a predetermined
number of builders. Three FFG follow-shipbuilding yards
were desired by the Navy and just recently (May 1976)





Three distinct acquisition policies are discernable
from the past two decades, each having differing
characteristics, and each having differing impact upon
the shipbuilding industry. The "conventional" policy
(pre-1960s) emphasized maintenance of a broad industrial
base for Naval shipbuilding through allocation of
shipbuilding contracts. Numerous shipyards, generally
ten or more, both military and private, were involved in
work from this period. The CF/CD policy (1962-1969) did
not stress such a broad shipbuilding base, but rather
emphasized a total package approach. Contracts were
awarded on the basis of competitive bidding. Only a
narrow production base was required; consequently, only
a few shipyards, none military, were involved. In fact,
all three of the new contracts awarded for non-nuclear
shipbuilding under CF/CD were awarded to one shipyard
—
Litton. The fact that only six shipyards have been
actively engaged in naval shipbuilding since 1972 is a
result primarily of the CF/CD policy. Also, the animosity
which has come largely from the results of the CF/CD
building programs has created an adversary relationship
between government and private shipbuilders. The most
significant manifestations of this relationship have been
in the negotiations for settlement of the multi-million
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dollar claims and the few bidders on very recent building
contracts. The present policy seeks to learn from the
lessons of the past. It appears that there is concern
for maintenance of a wider production base and more
appropriate contract terms for the builder, but the most
pressing challenge facing the Naval shipbuilding policies




THE CHARACTER OF U.S. SHIPBUILDING
The previous two chapters have discussed the
historical perspective of, and government role in, the
U.S. shipbuilding industry. Taken together, they show the
evolution of the industry through the guiding hand of
government. However, neither the industry nor the market
which it supplies have developed in a vacuum solely
dependent on themselves. They are but one segment of
the overall world market and, as will be observed, only a
small segment at that. The U.S. shipbuilding market can
be characterized as a complex interaction of government
and private enterprise with unstable demand in an
environment of large multinational corporations. Therefore,
the character of the U.S. shipbuilding industry must be
examined in a macro-sense in relation to its world
environment and in a micro-sense in relation to the
elements among which it is distributed.
4.1 In Relation to World Shipbuilding
Tables 4 and 5 present the shares of ships delivered
and new shipbuilding orders placed in the major world
shipbuilding nations. From these it is apparent that
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Table 5— Percentage of Orders Placed in the Principal
Shipbuilding Countries.
1J63 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975'
Japan 42.4 44.2 54.1 63.0 48.6 38.4 49.2
Brazil — 0.2 2.3 0.8 1.1 5.4 7.0
Poland 0.5 0.4 1.9 1.8 1.0 2.1 5.8
West Germany 7.0 5.7 4.0 2.5 7.1 8.9 5o2
United States 1.4 1.4 2.2 4.1 2.5 7.8 4.9
South Korea 1.3 2.8 3.7
Spain 5.9 6.8 4.8 2.7 5.6 2.5 3.3
Denmark 4.0 4.2 2.7 1.0 0.9 3.6 2.8
France 6.1 3.6 4.3 1.9 2.4 8.4 2.3
India — — 0.4 0.1 — — 1.9
Norway 3.3 4.6 4.3 1.3 3.1 1.5 1.9
Yugoslavia 4.1 1.4 0.3 0.6 1.3 1.3 1.7
Italy 3.2 2.8 1.8 1.8 3.3 1.7 1.3
Canada — — 0.9 0.2 0.5 1.4 1.0
Finland — 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.7 0.8
Belgium — — 0.5 — 0.6 O.b 0.6
Sweden 7.4 6.7 3.6 10.8 7.5 4.4 0.6
U.K. 7.3 4.9 4.0 2.3 5.9 1.6 0.6
Netherlands 2.5 5.4 1.6 0.6 1.8 1.7 0.5
Rest of World 4.9 7.4 5.8 4.0 4.6 4.0 4.7
Total Gross Tons
(millions) 30.0 41.0 29.6 30.4 73.6 28.4 13.8
U.S. Rank 12 11 11 3 8 4 5
source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping
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major competitor in the world market, producing less than
3% of the world's delivered tonnage in 1974 and 1975.
Since the early 1960s, the world production has been
dominated by Japan, which controls approximately one-half
of the tonnage output. Four interesting features of the
world shipbuilding market are brought out by the tables.
First is the clear and unchallenged domination of the world
market by the Japanese. Second is the recent emergence of
new shipbuilding centers, especially Brazil. Third is the
drastic decrease in annual ordered merchant tonnage from
more than 73 million tons in 1973 to less than 14 million
tons in 1975, an 81% decrease in just two years. This
would be due primarily to the combined effects of the
tanker ordering frenzy of 1972 and 1973 and the oil
embargo with the subsequent skyrocketing oil prices,
which have resulted in an extreme excess in tanker capacity
worldwide. Fourth is the low world position of
United States shipbuilding. As stated earlier, the U.S.
industry has not been, nor is it now, a major competitor in
the world merchant shipbuilding market. This is affirmed
in the tables, for even though triple the level of 1970,
the 1975 U.S. share of the world orders was less than 5%.
It is also interesting to note the rise in the U.S. rank
in new orders from eleventh to fifth since 1970, with a
high point of third in 1972, while maintaining such a small
share of the market. This is likely to be the result of
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the dilution effect as new shipbuilding centers such as
Brazil emerge, and the enormous building capacity of the
modern Japanese shipyards which enables them to retain their
huge share of the market.
It is true that the U.S. shipbuilding industry provides
only a small share of the world market, but this fact
must be modified on two counts. First, the United States
is effectively not an active competitor in the world
merchant shipbuilding market. Its production is generally
limited to naval vessels or merchant vessels whose U.S.
construction is required by federal legislation. The
nature of the American market is therefore very different
from that of other principal shipbuilding countries. As
shown in Figure 4-1, the United States is the only
principal shipbuilding nation that not only builds all of
its own flag fleet vessels (Figure A) , but also builds only
ships intended for its flag fleet (Figure B) . In this
regard, the U.S. market is a closed system. These conditions
can be attributed to higher U.S. shipbuilding costs,
requirements of federal statutes for American construction
of all U.S. flag vessels, and requirements for federal
direct and indirect aids.
Secondly, the Navy is the largest single customer of
the U.S. shipbuilding industry, as will be discussed.
Therefore, naval shipbuilding has a great impact upon the



















































vessels, the United States and the U.S.S.R., which have by
far the world's largest oceangoing naval fleets, are clear
leaders in ship production, not only in numbers and tonnage,
but also in technology. Therefore, even though the U.S.
shipbuilding industry is not a major factor in world
merchant shipbuilding, by considering total shipyard
employment and shipbuilding facilities and the technology
of the ships for both naval as well as merchant shipbuilding,
the United States ranks with Japan and the U.S.S.R. as
one of the top three shipbuilding nations [53, p. 49].
4.2 In Relation to U.S. Market Distribution
The U.S. shipbuilding market is essentially a closed
system. Vessels of the U.S. merchant flag fleet must be
U.S. -built by federal statute, and international markets
have been closed to American shipyards because of their
higher costs, although this situation is softening somewhat
due to world economic pressures which have tended to
reduce the cost gap. Thus, the United States market operates
essentially independent of the rest of the world.
The U.S. market has many facets to its distribution.
It can be divided into two market sectors—naval shipbuilding
and merchant shipbuilding. Many shipbuilding firms produce
on demand for this market naval and merchant ships of
widely varying types and sizes, the composition of which
has changed greatly over past years. The distribution of
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U.S. shipbuilding among these areas will be explored in
this section.
A. By major private U.S. shipbuilders
As noted previously, the number of active producers
of merchant and naval vessels has declined drastically
from the level after World War II. Today there are
approximately twenty-five private shipyards capable of
constructing oceangoing merchant or naval vessels; however,
of these, only six remain active in naval shipbuilding and
thirteen in merchant shipbuilding as of 1 January 1976. The
balance of the yards are engaged in construction of smaller
vessels, offshore drilling rigs, and ship repair. Also,
naval shipyards are no longer engaged in new construction.
Figure 4-2 shows the number of private shipyards actively
engaged in shipbuilding over the past two decades. Table
6 below lists the major participants in the construction
of oceangoing merchant and naval vessels, and their active
market sector since 1974. Figure 4-3 shows the geographical
location, and Table 7 presents a brief sketch of the
construction capabilities for each of these major U.S.
shipyards.
Tables 8 and 9 show the share of the merchant and
naval shipbuilding market sectors for each major private
shipyard during the past decade. It is clear from Table 8
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Figure 4 . 3— Geographical Location of The Major U.S. shipyards
Shipyards :
1. Bath Iron Works— (Congoleum Corp.)
2. Quincy Shipbuilding Division— (General Dynamics Corp.)
3. Electric Boat Division— (General Dynamics Corp,)
4. Seatrain Shipyard— (Seatrain Lines Inc.)
5. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.— (Sun Oil Co.)
6. Sparrows Point Shipyard— (Bethlehem Steel Co.)
7. Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.— (Tenneco Inc.)
8. Ingalls Shipyard— (Litton Industries)
9. Avondale Shipyards— (Ogden Corp.)
10. National Steel & Shipbuilding Co.— (Kaiser Industries)
11. Todd Shipyard- San Pedro
12. Todd Shipyard- Seattle
13. Lockheed Shipbuilding & Construction— (Lockheed Aircraft)




Major Private U.S. Shipbuilders
Shipbuilder Merchant Naval
National Steel & Shipbuilding (NASSCO)
Avondale Shipyard
Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.
Bethlehem Steel-Sparrows Point Shipyard
Seatrain Shipyard
General Dynamics-Quincy Shipyard
Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.
FMC Shipyards
Todd Shipyards-San Pedro and Seattle
Litton Shipyards
Bath Iron Works
Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Co.
General Dynamics-Electric Boat Division
shipbuilding. Avondale and Bethlehem Steel-Sparrows Point
shipyards have been leaders in the industry over this period,
at one point, accounting for nearly two-thirds of the
industry backlog. In recent years NASSCO and Newport News
have risen to join Avondale and Bethlehem-Sparrows Point
as the top four shipyards, processing over 70% of the industry
backlog at the beginning of 1976.
While the number of producers for both the merchant
















Table 7— Construction Capabilities, Facilities and Current
Employment of the Major U.S. Shipyards
Avondale Shipyards. Inc.
Construction Capability: Shios up to 1,2000 feet in length.
Has built merchant vessels of all types, Navy destroyers, Coast
Guard cutters and large drill rigs.
Facilities: In one building way, two vessels up to 960 feet
by 176 feet can be constructed simultaneously. In the other
shipway, three vessels can be in different stages of
construction simultaneously (or up to six vessels if total
lengths of each pair do not exceed 1200 feet). The largest of
Avondale' s two floating drydocks can accomodate a ship 960 feet
by 210 feet.
Current Employment: 6.700
Bath Iron Works Corp.
Construction Capabilities: Ships up to 700 feet in length.
Experienced in construction of RO/ROs, containerships, tankers,
Navy destroyers, guided missile frigates and oatrol frigates.
Facilities: Three large building ways, one large floating
drydock, and a steel floating partial drydock for bow sonar
dome installation. In 1974, completed a $14 million plant
modernization program.
Current Employment: 3.350
Bethlehem Steel Corp.— Sparrows Point Yard
Construction Capabilities: Ships up to 1200 feet by 192 feet,
during past two decades, specialized in series construstion of
standard sizes of tankers, and also freighters and container-
ships. Since recent facilities expansion program, has also
delivered two of a series of five 265,000 DVT VLCCs.
Facilities: A l^rge building basin (maximum ship size 1200





FKC Corp.— Marine and Rail Equipment Division
Construction Capability: Ships up to 700 feet by 100 feet.
In 1972, the yard entered the market for large seagoing ships
by signing a contract for construction of six 55,000 BWT tankers.
Facilities: One side-launching shipway (maximum ship size
700 feet by 100 feet). Drydocking and most outfitting is done
in the nearby Port of Portland facility.
Current Employment: 1,930
General Dynamics Corp.—Electric Boat Division
Construction Capability: Ship up to 690 feet in length.
E.3. specializes in the construction and overhaul of nuclear-
powered submarines for the Navy. Current construction
incolcment is in the SSN-688 Los Angeles and Trictent class
submarines.
Facilities: Four covered submarine building ways, two
dry docks and a floating arydock are used for SSN construction.
A new Land Level Construction Facility consisting of an inshore
erection area, an outboard erection area, and a graving dock and
pontoon facility is near completion for use in construction of
the new 3SN and Trident submarines. A separate steel processing
facility located at Quonset Point supports the construction
effort
.
Current Employment: 21,600 (Grot on), 4,990 (Quonset Point)
General Dynamics Corp.— Quincy Shipbuilding Division
Construction Capability: Ships uo to 1,000 feet by 144 feet.
From 1964 to 1973, delivered 18 ships to the Navy including two
ammunition ships, four nuclear powered submarines, six
replentishment oilers, two submarine tenders and four LSDs.
Prior to that time Quincy had built the first nuclear powered
surface ship. In 1973 ceased builuing Navy ships. Currently
engaged in construction of barge-carrying ships and 125,000
cubic meter LNG tankers.
Facilities: Five large graving docks and all necessary




$40 million improvement and modernization program for
construction of the LNG tankers.
Current Employment: 4,370
Litton Systems, Inc.—Ingalls Shipbuilding Division
Construction Capability: Ships up to 830 feet by 170 feet.
Experienced builder of cargoliners, containerships and tankers,
as well as Navy combatants and auxiliaries. Nuclear submarines
have also been constructed in the past.
Facilities: The East Bank yard has six conventional inclined
building ways and a small graving dock. The West Bank yard is
equipped for series production using modular construction
methods. The launch pontoon (floating drydock) is capable of
taking a ship 830 feet by 170 feet.
Current Employment: 23,490
Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Co.
Construction Capability: Ships up to 700 feet by 100 feet.
In the past has specialized mainly in Naval vessels; however,
recent construction includes RO/kO and bulk carriers in addition
to Coast Guard icebreaker and submarine tenders.
Facilities: Three inclined bui^uing ways suitable for'
construction of large ships anu three large floating uryaocks.
Current Employment: 2,000
National Steel and Shipbuilding Co.
Construction Capability: Ships up to 1,000 feet by 170 feet.
Experienced in building both Naval and commercial vessels,
having in the 1970s completed 17 Navy LSm s, five large cargo-
liners, two OBOr, four 38,300 DWT tankers ana five 89,700 L V;
tankers
.
Facilities: One large building b^sin, three iiarge inclined
shipways, a small floating drydock and a large graving dock.




Table 7— Continued e9
Newport News Shipbuilding and Lrydock Co,
Construction Capability: All types of ships up to 1600 feet
by 240 feet. A major producer of both Navy and merchant ships
including passenger liners, tankers, 125,000 cubic meter LWG
tankers, nuclear powered guided missile cruisers, nuclear
powered submarines and all of the Navy's nuclear powered
aircraft carriers.
Facilities: Four large building ways and three large graving
docks presently used for ship construction. Also, three small
graving docks for overhaul, conversion and repair work. In
1976, at a cost of approximately £180 million, Newport News
completed its new commercial yard centered around a new building
basin 1,600 feet long, 250 feet wide and 44 feet deep.
Current Employment: 23,388
Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp.
Construction Capability: Ships up to 1,094 feet by 143 feet.
Seatrain specializes in construction of large tankers and barges
Facilities: Two building basins capable of accomodating a
ship 1,094 feet by 143 feet and a smaller graving dock.
Current Employment: 1,480
Sun Shipbuilding and Prydock Co.
Construction Capability: All types of ships up to 1400 feet
by 195 feet. In rpcent years, has specialized in RO/RO trailer
ships and medium size tankers of its own design. Recently has
begun construction of 130,000 cubic meter LNG and 118,300 DWT
tankers. Sun has not been engaged in construction of Naval
shins in many years.
Facilities: Three large inclined building ways plus a new
level shipbuilding platform on which two halves of a ship as
large as 1400 feet by 195 feet can be constructed simultaneously
or two smaller shins, 700 feet in length or Less, can be built
simultaneously. Sun has one floating drydock suitable for a
ship 1,100 feet by 195 feet.
Current Employment: 4,060

Table 7— Continued 90
Todd Shipyards Corp.— Los Angeles Division
Construction Capability: Ships uo to 800 feet by 84 feet.
Since I960, has built guiaed missile frigates and destroyer
escorts for the Navy, as well as three break bulk cargo shins
and four 25,000 DWT tankers.
Facilities: Two inclined shipbuilding ways (maximum ship
size 800 feet by 84 feet) ana two floating drydocks.
Current Employment: 2,350
Todd Shipyards Corp.— Seattle Division
Construction Capability: Ships up to 550 feet by 96 feet.
In 1952, embarked on a new construction program which included
tugs, barges, ferries, dredges, pile drivers and floating cranes.
In 1964, completed a series of four guided missile destroyers.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, was lead yard for construction
of 26 destroyer escorts, seven of which were built in Todd
—
Seattle.
Facilities: One end-launch shinway (maximum ship size 550
feet by 96 feet). Also a double shipway 450 feet by 131 feet
on which two ships with beams of 50 feet or less can be built
simultaneously, or one ship of 60-foot beam or rrore. The yard
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the past few years, naval shipbuilding has become more
concentrated, in contrast to the opposite situation of
the 1960s (see Figure 4-2) . As of January 1976, there are
only six active producers of major naval vessels; however,
the market sector has clearly been dominated for some
years by two firms, Litton and Newport News, accounting
for over 70% of the market backlog since 1971. In very
recent years, General Dynamics-Electric Boat Division has
also come to the forefront due to the new and larger
Trident missile submarine building program (it should be
pointed out that Electric Boat builds only submarines) . The
huge share for Litton represents the large DD-963 and LHA
Navy contracts. That for Newport News represents the large
nuclear shipbuilding program of the Navy. Naval shipyards
have ceased to be a market factor in new construction since
1972.
It should be noted here that the change in the number
of shipyards active in each market sector is the result of
very different factors. Merchant shipbuilding is responsive
primarily to world and national economic factors and
government subsidy policies. The large rise in the number
of merchant shipbuilders after 1970 may be the result of
the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, which authorized a
broadened subsidy program, and economic pressures demanding
additional energy fuel-carrying capacity. Since 1973 the
market has contracted due largely to the oil embargo and

94
consequent overcapacity in tankers. In contrast, the
motive forces for the naval shipbuilding market are the
procurement policies of the Department of Defense and the
mood of Congress. The reduction in the number of active
naval shipbuilders has primarily been the result of
Defense Department Total Package Procurement policies,
discussed previously, and the greater emphasis on nuclear
shipbuilding. Producers for both market sectors are
greatly affected by the severely fluctuating demand
resulting from the above factors.
In general, it should be observed that three
shipyards—Seatrain, FMC and Sun Shipbuilding—have not
engaged in naval shipbuilding over the past decade (Seatrain
[1970] and FMC [1973] are new to the shipbuilding market)
,
and that Electric Boat builds only for the naval sector.
Electric Boat and Newport News account for all of the
nuclear submarine shipbuilding and Newport News monopolizes
nuclear surface shipbuilding.
B. By market sector
The distribution of the overall U.S. shipbuilding
activity into merchant and naval shipbuilding can be
explored using three parameters—number of vessels, tonnage
of vessels, and value of vessels. Figure 4-4 shows the
number share of the backlog of major merchant and naval
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in the number share of merchant vessels from 28% to 61%,
with approximately equal numbers of merchant and naval
ships building or on order in January 1976. Figure 4-5
shows the tonnage share of major merchant and naval
vessels building or on order for the past twenty years,
and indicates a rise from the low of 40% to a present level
of 90% of the overall backlog tonnage in merchant
vessels. The actual number and tonnage of vessels building
or on order for the past two decades is shown in Figure
4-6. All of these would indicate that, by size and number
indices, merchant shipbuilding predominates the market.
The conclusion to be drawn of the relative shares of
naval and merchant vessels is entirely different when
measured by value rather than size or number. Figure 4-7
and Table 10 present the value of unfinished shipbuilding
work and the value of work done, respectively. It is
clear from these that naval shipbuilding accounts for
approximately two-thirds of the overall shipbuilding market
value. This contradiction of the previous conclusion based
upon size indices is readily explained by consideration of
the tremendous difference in complexity and technology.
For example, a 90,000 DWT tanker could be built for
approximately $50-60 million, whereas a nuclear attack
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Figure 4.7— Aonroxirr.ate Value of Unfinished Uhipbuilding Work
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Naval-type vessels are produced exclusively for
federal government agencies, predominantly the U.S. Navy,
which is the largest single customer of the U.S. shipbuilding
industry. Additionally, another government agency, the
Maritime Administration, provides 35-50% of the cost of
certain new merchant vessels through the construction-
differential subsidy program. Table 11 shows how the
amount of subsidized new merchant ship construction has
grown to the extent that today a large majority of
shipbuilding is subsidized. Considered with the value
share of naval shipbuilding, this means that the federal
government accounts for approximately three-fourths of
the industry backlog value and is therefore in a very
monopsonistic position to determine the character and
direction of the shipbuilding industry.
C. By type of ships produced
As was mentioned previously, the merchant and naval
shipbuilding market sectors respond to different stimuli.
The merchant sector is primarily responsive to economic
forces, whereas the naval sector is primarily responsive
to governmental and political forces. Variation in the
type of ships that are produced for each market sector
will reflect these motive forces. Figure 4-8 shows the
tonnage share and types of merchant vessels building or on
order for the past two decades. Very noticeable from this
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Table 10— Value of Shipbuilding Work Lone U millions)
New Self-Propelled N<?w Self-Propelled








Source: Bureau of the Census
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Table 11—Merchant Vessels Subsidized by the Maritime
Administration3
Year Number Percent DWT (000) Percent
1964 36 78.3 432.3 65.1
1965 49 94.2 567.7 84.1
1966 57 83.8 573.9 59.2
1967 62 74.7 687.7 58.1
1968 58 65.9 775.3 41.3
1969 43 63.2 738.0 36.9
1970 29 53.7 547.4 25.8
1971 29 55.8 614.1 25.9
1972 31 52.5 913.5 31.9
1973 48 51.6 2807.7 62.1
1974 57 61.9 4081.6 67.4





Figure 4.8— Types of Merchant Vessels (over 1000 DWT)




















figure are the facts that the market demand for new cargo
ships has disappeared after once representing over 80%
of the merchant backlog tonnage, and that tanker demand
has varied from 95% to less than 5% and then back to
nearly 80% of the present backlog. Also apparent is the
rise of new-technology, high-efficiency container and
LASH types and, most recently, the LNG tanker. All of
these are reflections of economic pressures and market
demand of their times. Today, oil tankers and LNG tankers
dominate the market demand with 77% and 12% of the backlog
tonnage, respectively.
Figure 4-9 shows the tonnage share and types of
major naval vessels building or under contract for the
past ten years. Evident from this is the emergence of
a very large proportion of nuclear vessels. This, again,
is representative of the governmental and political policies
in force, which have been heavily inclined towards a more
"nuclear Navy" as evidenced by the nuclear guided-missile
frigate, aircraft carrier, attack submarine and Trident
missile submarine building programs. The other major
programs in progress are the DD-963 destroyers, the
Amphibious Assault Carriers (LHA) , and submarine and
destroyer tenders. Presently, the nuclear shipbuilding
program accounts for 43% of the backlog by tonnage and
approximately 56% ($5 billion) by contract value (49%
by tonnage and 59% [$5.9 billion] by announced contract
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Figure 4.9— Tynes of Naval Vessels (over 1000 Tons Full





















value in 1975) . Amphibious and auxiliary-type ships have
consistently represented a very large portion of naval
shipbuilding. In 1976 this group represented 33% of the
backlog tonnage, but only 12% ($1.1 billion) of the
contract value (35% tonnage and 11$ [$1.1 billion] in
1975)
.
4 . 3 Summary
The U.S. shipbuilding market thus comprises two
market sectors—merchant and naval shipbuilding. Within
world shipbuilding, the U.S. merchant sector is only a
minor influence; however, considered in conjunction with
the extensive U.S. naval shipbuilding sector, the United
States must be ranked with Japan and the U.S.S.R. as the
leading shipbuilding nations. The U.S. market is a closed
system in that it is effectively isolated from the rest
of the world market, for American shipbuilders are
essentially excluded from building vessels for foreign
buyers due to the higher U.S. costs and foreign
production of U.S. flag merchant or naval vessels is
prohibited by federal law.
The merchant shipbuilding sector today represents
approximately 50% of the vessels and 90% of the tonnage
building or under contract, but only about one-third of
the value of unfinished shipbuilding work. Of the
twenty-five shipyards that are presently capable of
constructing major merchant vessels, only thirteen
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are actively engaged, and these are dominated by four major
producers which represent more than 70% of the backlog
tonnage. The market demand for merchant vessels is
determined primarily by oil and LNG tankers which account
for 90% of the market sector backlog tonnage.
The naval shipbuilding sector, which represents
approximately two-thirds of the value of unfinished
shipbuilding work, is supplied by six shipyards, but is
clearly dominated by three firms which represent nearly
90% of the backlog tonnage. This is primarily the
result of ship acquisition policies of the Department of
Defense and the nuclear shipbuilding program. Unlike the
merchant sector, market demand in the naval shipbuilding
sector is determined by government policy and politics.
This is manifest in the large proportion of the tonnage
(43%) and contract value (56%) represented by nuclear
ships.
The U.S. shipbuilding market is dominated by one
customer— the federal government, primarily the U.S.
Navy. Not only is the government the sole customer in
the naval sector, it also provides, through the Maritime
Administration, direct financial subsidy, amounting to
from 35% to 50% of the new construction costs of the
majority of merchant ships. Therefore, the U.S.
shipbuilding market can be characterized as being
oligopolistic in terms of U.S. industry supply to the
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merchant and naval fleets, and manopsonistic in terms of




CONGLOMERATES IN THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
The discussion of the previous chapters has been
directed toward the development of the character of
shipbuilding in the United States. The remainder of this
study will build upon this to discuss changes in the
shipbuilding industry which have been attributed to the
conglomerate movement. To be presented initially is a brief
historical perspective on conglomeration and some of the
important features of conglomeration. These will be
discussed relative to the shipbuilding industry with
specific business organizations identified and discussed
for each of the major U.S. shipbuilders. Following this
chapter will be a discussion of influences of conglomerates
seen in the shipbuilding industry.
5.1 Conglomerate Defined
Ansoff has proposed four broad classes of growth
strategies for a firm: market penetration, market
development, product development, and diversification [3]
.
The last strategy, diversification, will be the
one of interest in this study. Diversification can be
achieved in three modes of acquisition: horizontal,
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vertical, and conglomerate. Broadly defined, horizontal
acquisitions involve firms that are direct competitors;
vertical mergers involve firms that had a buyer-seller
relationship; and conglomerate mergers are those that
involve neither horizontal nor vertical mergers. More
specifically:
A horizontal consolidation rounds out a firm's
product line by increasing the line of goods sold
to its customers. A vertical consolidation builds
the firm's capabilities either "forward" toward its
markets or "backwards" toward the source of supply.
A conglomerate is the complement of the above two
to the complete set: it describes "all other"
mergers, and in popular parlance describes them as
"unrelated" [13].
This notion of the conglomerates as being built through
"all other" and "unrelated" mergers will be adopted for
the purposes of this study.
5.2 Historical Perspective of Business Mergers
and Acquisitions
Business mergers and acquisitions over the past
century have had a very large influence upon the structure
and development of American industry. During this period
there were five major periods of merger activity. Each of
these built upon the experiences of those past and the
changing law and public policy towards business combinations
The first such period was that of the formation of the Great
Trusts from 1879 to 1893. The trusts were formed by
transferring ownership of a portfolio of companies from the
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stockholders to trustees who managed the business
portfolio. This era saw the formation of such large
business organizations as the Standard Oil Trust (1879),
which controlled nearly all of the U.S. oil refinery and
pipeline capacity, the Cottonseed Oil Trust and the National
Lead Trust, and large holding companies such as the
Diamond Match Company (1889) , the American Tobacco
Company (1890) , the United States Rubber Company (1892)
,
and the General Electric Company (1892) [42, p. 20]. This
period of merger activity subsided in 1893 due to an
economic recession and the series of adverse antitrust
court decisions.
This first major period served as a prelude to
heightened merger activity over the turn of the century
from 1895 to 1904. Building upon the previous period,
which had been dominated by trust formation, and in
response to the changed public policy outlawing trust
formation, this second major period was characterized by
the combination of many firms in the same industry
into a single large corporation, i.e. horizontal mergers,
resulting in large concentrations of industry volume. Many
of the large corporations formed during this period continue
today as major firms in their industries, firms such as
United States Steel, Republic Steel, Bethlehem Steel, and
Dupont. This merger wave closed with adverse Supreme
Court antitrust decisions holding that many of the
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large corporate mergers were in violation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act (1890) . As a result, many of the corporate
giants were ordered to divest certain of their business
holdings. Notable among these were the American Tobacco
Company, which became the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco,
Liggett & Meyers Tobacco, P. Lorillard, and United Cigar
Stores Companies [United States v. American Tobacco Co.
,
221 U.S. 106 (1911)], and the Standard Oil Company [Standard
Oil Co. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911)]. United States Steel
emerged essentially intact [United States v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920)].
A third merger movement occurred during the period
1925-1931, coinciding with one of the greatest periods of
stock market activity in U.S. history. For the three
successive years from 1928 to 1930 the New York Stock
Exchange trading exceeded one billion shares for each
year. Not until 1959 was the one billion share mark again
reached, and then with more than four times the number of
firms listed on the exchange. Present large corporations
originating from merger activity of this period are
National Steel, General Foods, United Aircraft, Caterpillar
Tractor, National Dairy Products, and others. Another
aspect of this movement was the acquisition of many major
public utilities by holding companies, resulting in several
utility empires. This acquisition pattern was met with a
new public merger policy in the Public Utility Holding
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Company Act of 1935 which caused a number of the utility
empires to divest themselves of many operating subsidiaries.
The most significant contribution of this merger period to
the present wave of conglomeration is probably the shift
in corporate organizational structure from a highly
centralized and functionally specialized form to the
decentralized, multi-divisional form. This was pioneered
by Alfred P. Sloan at General Motors as well as those at
Dupont and Standard Oil of New Jersey, and can be
considered as a major stimulus for the conglomerate movement
because the new technique greatly enhanced the ability of
management to control a widely diversified business
effectively.
The fourth major period is that from World War II to
the mid-1960s, which saw the rise of such enterprises as
Sperry Rand, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, Textron
and Ogden, Litton, Tenneco, General Dynamics and Kaiser
which have major holdings in shipbuilding. Whereas the
first two merger periods near the turn of the century were
characterized by trust and horizontal mergers, the third
period, although continuing this trend, gave rise to more
vertical mergers, integrating manufacturers, suppliers, and
distributors. This period not only exhibited expansion of
the vertical merger trend, but also a tremendous upsurge
in the number of conglomerate mergers. Figure 5-1 portrays
the significant surge of all types of merger as well as
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during this period. The period of incredible upsurge
in merger activity in the late 1960s can be considered as
a fifth merger period due to the significantly increased
annual rate of mergers, even though the characteristics
are very much the same as for the early 1960s. A
distinguishing feature between these two periods is the
significance of the conglomerate merger. To be sure,
conglomerate mergers play an important role in both
periods, but, as shown in Table 12, the relative
importnace of horizontal and vertical mergers has
declined markedly, from a combined total of 31% in 1960
to 12% in 1970, with a corresponding growth in conglomerates
Many of the characteristics of the present conglomerate
movement were also exhibited by the formation of large
holding companies in the 1900 and 1920 periods; however,
the recent movement is characterized by a significant
portion of "pure" conglomerate mergers—those that
involve firms that are wholly unrelated. Conglomerate
mergers have been made in the past by older, established
firms; however, the most striking characteristic of this
period is the use of the conglomerate device by relatively
new firms in order to achieve rapid growth. Some of
these firms have grown so rapidly that in a few years
they have risen from virtual obscurity to be included
among the 100 largest manufacturers.
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Table 12— Large Mining and Manufacturing Merger Activity
by Type of Mprrp n












* Firms with assets of $10 million and more
source: Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission















5.3 General Characteristics of Conglomerates
A. Some reasons for the recent conglomerate movement
Simply speaking, the motivation for any voluntary
business consolidation is to forward the goals of the firm,
as seen by its management, by a means most advantageous to
the firm, but ultimately falling under the purview of
public policy. The history of business mergers and
acquisitions has shown that changes in the techniques
used by companies are generally in reaction to changing
public policy whether it be decisions in law, interpretations
of existing law, anti-trust law enforcement policies, tax
policies, incorporation laws, or other elements of public
policy. Over recent years, companies have turned to
conglomerate acquisitions primarily for two reasons.
First, the success of anti-trust suits before the federal
courts has led many executives to believe that the courts
have effectively barred the way to many horizontal and
vertical mergers, thereby making conglomerate mergers
the only feasible means of merger growth. Since
conglomerates have had much less impact upon market
concentration, it became increasingly clear that a
large horizontal or vertical acquisition was likely to
be challenged successfully, whereas the conglomerate
appeared less vulnerable to such attack. A second
motivation for conglomerate acquisition has been
financial. A major factor in this reason deals with the
stock market and the price-earnings multiple, prompting
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Business Week to term conglomerates as the "figment of
Wall Street's imagination" [12]. Simply speaking, the
higher a conglomerate's stock price relative to its earnings
per share, the less it spends to buy another company.
Therefore, if a conglomerate with a high price-earnings
multiple acquires a company with a low multiple, the end
result (assuming equal numbers of shares outstanding) will
be that the multiple of the conglomerate will rise, and
probably also its stock price will rise.
This is not to say that the motivations for
conglomerate acquisitions are so easily identified and
classified. On the contrary, they are widely diverse and
in general may be difficult to assess in a particular
case. Many other major factors have been offered, some
of which are briefly discussed below [55, 32, 13]:
1. desire of owners of smaller firms to convert
their holdings into more readily marketable
securities;
2. desire of management of large firms for growth for
its own sake;
3. desire to limit competition or achieve monopoly
profits;
4. the opportunity to bring more efficient management




5. the possibility of achieving economies of scale by
combining product lines, production techniques, or
staff services;
6. response to shrinking opportunities for growth and/or
profit in one's own industry due to shrinking
demand or excessive competition;
7. desire to diversify business activities to reduce
risks by using one firm's cash flows or credit in
another firm with financial difficulties or limited
access to capital;
8. desire to overcome critical lacks in one's own
company by acquiring the necessary complementary
resources, expertise, technology, or factors of
production;
9. desire to more fully utilize particular resources
or personnel controlled by the firm, with particular
applicability to managerial skills;
10. desire to acquire sources of cash flow to finance
further acquisition activity;
11. desire of managers to create an image of themselves
as aggressive managers who recognize a good thing
when they see it;
12. desire to manage an ever-growing portfolio of
firms, i.e. empire building;
13. desire to displace an existing management; and
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14. a desire to utilize tax loopholes available through
merger or acquisition.
B. Characteristics that encourage conglomerate take-over
In general, those characteristics of a firm which
satisfy the conglomerate growth needs and policies, such
as those above, tend to encourage take-over. Some of the
specific traits which have been found to be significant
include the following [55, 32, 13]:
1. management that is willing to be acquired for any of
a number of reasons such as retirement of major
management shareholders, need for cash, or inadequate
successor ship;
2. bad management resulting in dissatisfied
stockholders or ineffective resistance to take-over;
3. unused borrowing power and excessive liquidity;
4. huge amounts of book write-off for depreciation
or depletion;
5. cash flow that is unbalanced due to either a
continuous excess of cash over internal investment
opportunities or continuously insufficient cash for
profitable investment opportunities; and




C. Allegations concerning conglomerates in general
With the rise of the conglomerate movement of recent
years has come increased awareness of the public and
attention in the press, literature, and particularly in
government agencies, not the least of which are Congress
and the Justice Department. As the major conglomerates have
become bigger and bigger, the increased publicity and
scrutiny has brought forward numerous allegations and
fears concerning the detrimental effects of conglomerates.
Much of this has come about through the popular view of
the monster octopus conglomerate gobbling up the innocent
small-fry companies with ever-increasing regularity and
appetite, and a rekindling of the "big is bad" doctrine
from the trust-busting days. Most of the allegations are
associated with potentially harmful effects of conglomerates
on competition in the U.S. economy and possible conflict
with anti-trust laws because of the attainment of unfair
and decisive competitive advantages. The characteristics
under attack in this regard derive primarily from size
and diversity. Also, other allegations have arisen
concerning an imputed bad character of conglomerate
firms and deleterious social and community effects.
Many allegations have received wide and detailed
discussions throughout the literature; however, few
concrete supportable conclusions have been made. It is
beyond the scope of this study to analyze them in any
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detail, but those must frequently encountered will be
briefly discussed.
1. Reciprocity ; This occurs when companies agree,
either tacitly or explicitly, to buy from one
another. It has been alleged that conglomerates are
able to coerce suppliers or other companies into
buying from them instead of, and at a disadvantage
from, other competitors because of the conglomerate's
power in many markets. The literature is generally
supportive of the potential for reciprocal dealing
occurring; however, the fact that there is a potential
for such anti-competitive dealings does not certify
its existence. Many writers conclude that, even if
reciprocal dealing is a consequence of
conglomeration, it is only of minor significance
and in certain situations may be beneficial. Only
a very few cases have arisen in which anti-competitive
or fraudulent reciprocity has been substantiated.
2. Tied-in sales and exclusive dealings : It has been
argued that if a conglomerate has monopoly power
in one market, it can exert this power over other
markets by requiring or tying-in the sale of
products over which it has no monopoly power with
those over which it does. Again, the prevailing
conclusion seems to be that conglomeration does
increase the potential for such a malady, but there
is no substantiation of its prevalance.
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3. Elimination of potential competition : Anti-competitive
aspects of this charge concern elimination of the
conglomerate as an additional competitive force because,
absent acquisition, it would have been a "potential"
entrant into a particular product or geographical
market. The definition and extent of "potential"
is currently the subject of federal and FTC court
action; however, this is felt to be most successfully
charged by the FTC in cases in which a leading firm
has been acquired [80]
.
4. Unfair economies of scale ; The assertion here is
that conglomeration will yield economies of scale
which will ultimately reach anti-competitive
proportion. The substance of this argument appears
to be that the economies of scale will be severe
barriers to entry and will drive out existing
competition. This seems very speculative in nature,
but nonetheless had been successfully prosecuted
in some cases, such as in the striking down of
Procter & Gamble's merger with Clorox [FTC v. Procter &
Gamble, 386 U.S. 568 (1967)], and General Foods'
acquisition of SOS [General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386
F 2d. 936 (1967) ] .
5. Predatory pricing : Predatory pricing practices are
associated with conglomeration because it is felt
that it can subsidize sales below cost in one market
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through holdings in other markets, thereby driving
out competition and raising barriers to entry. It
is generally agreed that predatory pricing is
certainly possible in conglomerate situations and is
a real and present danger, but in the absence of
effective barriers to entry it would be impossible
to indefinitely maintain a monopoly position by a
superior capacity to lose money.
6. Political influence : This fear of undue or illicit
political influence seems well-founded, especially
since recent revelations of illegal campaign
contributions and foreign subversive activities of
certain large corporations; however, it does not seem
to warrant indictment of conglomerates in general.
By and large the conclusion of the literature on this
point is that political influence can be gained by
conglomerates, but this is also undeniably true for
other large companies or special interest groups such
as labor unions.
7. Centralization of headquarters : Some displeasure
has been expressed concerning relocation of
management headquarters of newly acquired firms,
dislocation of previous managers and absentee
management which is insensitive to local situations,
especially when a facility is closed. The literature
is generally sympathetic to these matters, but not
to any great extent in the overall scheme of things.
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8. Community of interest : It has been alleged that,
for example, two large conglomerates can agree, either
tacitly or explicitly, to cooperate for the betterment of
both, such as in agreeing to less than vigorous competition
of one firm in one market in return for similar behavior
of the other firm in another market. This permits both
to strengthen themselves in their "protected" market.
Restriction of this malady to conglomerates is not
supported by the literature.
9. General bad character ; It has been alleged that
conglomerate management by its very nature is dishonest and
deceitful, particularly in relation to the stockholders,
because of "creative accounting" practices and consolidated
financial reporting. This is probably true in some
instances, but it should be equally true that some take
pains to inform their investors. Again, this allegation
is difficult to show conclusively; however, new FTC
financial reporting regulations have sought to minimize its
occurrence.
D. Economic performance of the conglomerate
Even though the conglomerates have been the target
of numerous allegations and criticisms concerning their
impact upon the industrial economic structure, as discussed
above, there are other characteristics of the conglomerate
that can determine their net economic performance as a
business entity. Joel Dean has suggested some sources of
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superior and inferior economic performance of the
conglomerate in comparison with its constituent companies,
i.e., what would have happened absent conglomeration versus
what will happen with it [13]. These are listed below.
—Potential sources of superior economic performance:
1. Better rationing of capital
2. Better mobilization of internally-sourced capital
3. Lower cost of capital
4. Better allocation of human resources
5. Better successorship
6. Full utilization of tax shields
7. Greater managerial accountability
8. Better financial controls
9. Greater cross-industry mobility
10. Scale economies of staff services
—Potential sources of inferior economic performance:
1. Distortion of corporate goals
2. Non-economic product mix
3. Limited cross-industry transferability of
managerial ability
4. Imperfect profit center decentralization
5. Excessive size
6. Excessive preoccupation with growth
7. Top-heavy capital structure
8. Impaired managerial incentives
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5.4 Entrance of Conglomerates into the
U.S. Shipbuilding Industry
A. Shipyard corporate changes
The corporate structure of the U.S. shipbuilding
industry has undergone a marked change since 1959. Many of
the previously independent shipyards have been merged with
large corporations, most notable of which has been the
conglomerate acquisition of a number of companies formerly
totally devoted to shipbuilding. These shipbuilding
companies are now being operated as divisions or subsidiaries
of their corporate parent. The most significant of these
changes are shown below.
Shipbuilding Company Acquired By Year
Avondale Shipyards






















Other changes have also taken place. In 1964 Bethlehem
Steel Corp. (Shipbuilding Division) closed its Quincy shipyard

128
and sold it to the General Dynamics Corp. The Quincy
facility brought to General Dynamics shipbuilding the
capability to construct both merchant and Naval surface
ships. Until that acquisition, GD shipbuilding activities
were directed solely towards submarine construction at their
Electric Boat Division. Bethlehem Steel's disposition
of the Quincy shipyard resulted from corporate financial
difficulties and the decision to withdraw from Naval
ship construction, which had been the primary function of the
Quincy yard. This policy has been adhered to with the
exception of contracts for two ammunition ships at their
Sparrows Point shipyard in 1965.
Bath Iron Works merged with the flooring manufacturing
firm Congoleum-Nairn in 1967. Up to that time, Bath had
been almost totally dedicated to shipbuilding and was long
considered to be the premier builder of Navy Destroyers.
Through further corporate diversifications into the home
furnishings industry, the Bath shipbuilding company has been
absorbed into the Congoleum Corporation. Shipbuilding now
represents only a minor portion of the overall corporate
business activities.
In 1969, Seatrain Lines Inc. took over the facilities
of the former New York Navy Yard on a long-term lease
arrangement from the government, with federal and New York
City financial assistance. In turn, it agreed to hire and
train 9000 workers, most hard-core unemployed, over a
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period of five years. The Seatrain shipyard is now engaged
in construction of 225,000 dwt supertankers.
Table 13 lists the major U.S. shipbuilding parent
corporations and their corporate classifications which have
been adopted for this study. Under the definition of
conglomerate adopted in the previous section, many of the
major U.S. shipbuilders are now controlled by conglomerate
corporations. Almost all of the companies, conglomerate
as well as non-conglomerate, which now control major U.S.
shipbuilders, are very large corporations in the overall
national industry. However, because of their corporate
size, shipbuilding activities generally do not make up a
large portion of the firms' interests. These points are
shown in Tables 14, 15, and 16. Table 14 presents the
Fortune 500 rankings of the twelve major shipbuilding
parent corporations, showing that many rank very high in
national industry. Tables 15 and 16 present brief
divisional profiles for the conglomerates and the
corporations, respectively, showing the portion of overall
business activities represented by shipbuilding and repair
work.
B. Some motives for conglomerate shipyard acquisitions
Numerous motives for conglomerate acquisitions were
presented in the previous chapter. Many of these, as well
as others, have played a part in the conglomerate take-over
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* Classifications in accordance with the definition of
conglomerate discussed and adopted previously
** NASSCO is in dual ownership of Kaiser Industries (50$) and
Morrison-Knudson Inc. (50?o) but management and operational
control lies with Kaiser Industries.
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* 1976 rankings from Fortune , May 1976
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Table 15— Brief Shipbuilding; Conglomerate divisional Profiles
Tenneco Inc. (Newport Mews Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.)
j> /* 1^75 RevenuesManufacturing '
—
c








Litton Industries (Ingalls/Litton Shipbuilding)
Business Systems ana Equipment 30'/o
Defense, Commercial ana Marine Systems
Navigational & Control Systems 7
Commercial & T)ata Systems 7
Marine Engineering ft Production 22
Industrial Systems ft Equipment 19
Professional Services <§• Equipment 15
Op-den Corp. (Avondale Shipyards)








FMC Corporation (FMC Shipyard)
Machinery (Petroleum ft Fluid Control, ^^
Materials hanaling, construction ft
mining, food ft agriculture mach. , environmental, power
























Kaiser Cement & Gypsum 1
NASSCO 1
data source: Corporate Annual Reports
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Table 16— Brief Shipbuilding Corporate Divisional Profiles
Lockheed Aircraft (Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Co.)
% 1975 Revenues
Aircraft 64%
Missile, Space Propulsion .,,
and Electronics
Shipbuilding and Construction 2
Seatrain Lines (Seatrain Shipyard)
Freight and Charter 56%
Shipbuilding 44
Sun Oil Co. (Sun Shipbuilding)
Refined Products 76%
Cruae, Condensate ft Synthetic Crude 11
Natural Gas 6
Related Products & Services 5
Shipbuilding ft Repair 2
Todd Shipyards Inc. (Todd Shipyards)
Marine Construction 94%
Machinery Manufacture 6





Marine Construction ft Repair 35




Bethlehem Steel Corp. (Sparrows Point Shipyard)
Divisions not listed- Shipbuilding approximately 1%
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of shipbuilders. Although it is generally not possible to
determine the exact reason for a particular merger, review
of some known factors, pertaining in general or to a specific
case, can yield greater insight into the motivation for
conglomerate entrance into the shipbuilding industry.
First, three of the conglomerate shipyard acquisitions
(Avondale, Ingalls and National Steel) occurred close to
1960. This was a recessionary period where poor financial
outlooks and low orderbook for the shipyards may have played
an important role in their decision to merge. Additionally,
both Ingalls and Newport News were known to have been in
financial difficulty at the time of their acquisition.
A second factor which may have drawn conglomerates towards
acquisition of a shipbuilder was the policy of shipbuilding
progress payments by the Navy. A typical problem which faces
many conglomerates is a lack of cash available for further
diversification. Progress payments on Navy shipbuilding
contracts may have been an aid in this regard. Until about
1970, the Navy routinely made partial payments to
shipbuilders based upon costs incurred. The payments were
made weekly, but since the shipbuilder generally paid a
large portion of the early bills on a monthly basis, the
company, in effect, was given a free loan for a period of
time. This motive has been associated by some with the
Tenneco acquisition of Newport News. The payment policies
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have been changed since 1970 and present no substantial
advantage any longer.
Some other more specific motives for merger are:
—Avondale Shipyards, which was established in 1938 and
specialized in construction of barges and small oceangoing
vessels, began a steady growth following World War II. In
1958 the shipyard was awarded its first contract for
construction of large merchant vessels, and this was
followed by award of more large oceangoing ship construction
contracts, establishing Avondale as a large builder of
seagoing vessels. The original owners were at that time
having the problems of expanded financial and managerial
demands experienced by many owners of small, closely-held
corporations that had become large, and negotiations resulted
in Ogden Corporation acquiring the Avondale Shipyard in
1959 [66, Vol. II, p. 10833 and 68, p. 787].
--Marine construction began at the National Steel &
Shipbuilding Co. in 1945, but its greatest growth has
taken place since 1957 when the decision was made to
expand into the middle tonnage merchant ship construction.
That period was generally considered to have been
unfavorable for the shipbuilding industry as a whole;
however, NASSCO achieved its greatest growth in the
following decade, early in which ownership passed to Kaiser
and Morrison-Knudson [66, Vol. II, p. 10979].
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—The Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. offered
Tenneco an opportunity for considerable growth and
expansion in the shipbuilding industry. This was especially
appealing due to the anticipated increase in shipping demand
from the Alaskan North Slope oil fields. Also, Tenneco had
been negotiating with the Russians for a large sale of
natural gas; consequently, this produced an investment
opportunity in the construction of large oil tankers as
well as LNG tankers [19]
.
—Litton Industries is a technologically-oriented
corporation which achieves growth through the development
of new products for new markets, new products for old
markets and the improvement of existing products for
existing markets. Litton planned to acquire other companies
whose products and future might also benefit from
technological innovations and management concepts which
were then envisioned or believed to be forthcoming. The
Ingalls Shipbuilding Company offered Litton an attractive
opportunity to market its technology, especially in view
of their connections with the Defense Department and the
new Total-Package Procurement policies for Navy shipbuilding
[66, Vol. II, p. 10804, and 68, p. 997].
—Congoleum Corp. is the only conglomerate involved in
the shipbuilding industry which had its origin as a
shipbuilder. Its original firm, Bath Iron Works, was bought
into by William Kyle in 1964. Before that time, Kyle had
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been a corporate entrepreneur; starting up companies, building
them up, and selling them at a profit. His desire to run a
company with a billion-dollar potential that was a quality
producer in an industry hard to get into, brought him to
Bath. Kyle seized control in 1967 and almost immediately
began diversification with the acquisition of Congoleum-Nairn,
which was followed by several other home furnishings
companies [7]
.
5 . 5 Summary
Conglomerates were identified as being composed of
unrelated business segments through mergers and acquisitions
that are neither vertical nor horizontal in nature. Through
five major periods of merger activity since 1879,
conglomeration has become a dominant means of diversified
business growth since about 1960. An especially tremendous
upsurge in overall merger activity, particularly for
conglomerates, was seen to occur in the period of the late
1960s. Impetus for the most recent conglomerate movement
lies in the existing law and public policy. Antitrust
suits before federal courts and antitrust policy of the
federal government have led many to conclude that
conglomerate mergers are the only feasible means for merger
growth remaining. However, public policy is a dynamic
consideration. Numerous allegations concerning
detrimental characteristics of conglomerates and
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the changing political philosophy of the national
administration may bring on changes to the public policy.
The major allegations against conglomerates include
reciprocity, tied-in sales, elimination of potential
competition, unfair economies of scale, predatory pricing,
and undue political influence. Most deal with potentially
harmful effects upon competition, but few have been
generally given credence as a general indictment of
conglomerates. Each firm must be evaluated individually.
The recent period of heightened merger activity which
has affected all of American industry, has also resulted
in a changed corporate structure of the U.S. shipbuilding
industry. Most of the major shipyards have changed hands
during this period. The corporations which have entered
the shipbuilding industry are found to rank high in U.S.
industry, and their shipbuilding acquisitions generally
represent small portions of their overall corporate
structure. Notable among these entrants are a number of
conglomerate firms. It is felt that two major factors
which drew conglomerates into the industry were financial
difficulty of shipyards and payment policies on Naval
ship construction. Other more specific motives for
particular shipyards were also discussed. With the
entrance of numerous conglomerate firms into the shipbuilding
industry and the dominant position which they have
achieved, much debate has arisen concerning the impact of
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the conglomerates. Major influences of the conglomerates




INFLUENCES OF CONGLOMERATES ON THE U.S.
SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
During the past fifteen years the U.S. shipbuilding
industry has experienced many changes. One of the most
visible of these changes has been the wave of conglomerate
acquisition of many of the shipyards and their rise to
dominance in the shipbuilding market. The influence that
this has had on the industry is a highly controversial
issue. Previously discussed was the historical development
and nature of conglomeration in general and the conglomerate
firms that have become involved in shipbuilding. Within
this context, it is the purpose of the following section
to explore the influences of the conglomerates which the
author feels to be of significance to the shipbuilding
industry, either actual or alleged. The areas to be
investigated are facility expansion and modernization
programs, organizational structure, management philosophy
and expertise, Navy shipbuilding claims, power and
influence, and financial reporting. An extensive
examination of the Navy shipbuilding claims issue will be
made because of the impact this problem has had upon the
major U.S. shipbuilding market sector.

142
6.1 Facility Expansion and Modernization
Programs
Facility expansion and modernization programs are the
lifeblood of almost any company. This is especially true
for the U.S. shipbuilders, whose facilities had grown
increasingly obsolete after World War II until the mid-1960s
In recent years, numerous factors have confronted the
shipbuilders which have even increased the requirement for
facility expansion and modernization in order to enable
survival and growth. These factors include the changing
nature of the product to longer, wider, deeper ships
requiring larger drydocks, building ways and piers; the
new technology of vessels in the LNG, LPG, and supertanker;
the advent of new production methods and automation which
must be taken advantage of to facilitate a movement to
more capital-intensive operations; the changing economic
conditions and market structure; and changing employment
requirements. Evidence indicates that the acquisition of
shipyards by conglomerate firms has brought to the U.S.
shipbuilding industry an enhanced capability to undertake
the large expansion and modernization programs needed.
A. Analysis
Figure 6-1 shows the level of capital expenditures from
1958 to 1975. This shows an upsurge of expenditures for
facility improvement programs since 1970 which is generally
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attributed to high expectation for the future shipbuilding
market and the impetus of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970.
The Commission on American Shipbuilding Report points out
that the capital investment in the larger (conglomerate)
shipyards has grown steadily, while that for the other
yards has leveled off or declined [53, p. 83, 234-244,
54, p. 367] . Table 17 presents a tabulation of contemplated
facility improvement programs (as expressed by the
shipbuilders in testimony before the House Seapower
Subcommittee in 1970 and 1974) [66, Vol. 2 and 67, Vol. 2]
and their present status [67, Vol. 1, p. 47-55, Vol. 3,
p. 1194, and 2, p. 1-23 to 1-27] for each major
shipbuilder. Review of the progress made on the contemplated
improvement programs shows that only one major shipbuilder
was unable to achieve substantial progress—Todd Shipyard.
Todd announced in 1972 that it was embarking upon a large
expansion program in its Galveston and San Pedro yards which
would add the capability to build the large tanker and LNG
ships [62, 1972] . In their 1974 Annual Report Todd announced
that due to financial difficulties experienced in recent
years and in view of the large capital investment required,
the expansion program at Galveston was being delayed
indefinitely. Essentially no facility expansion has been
completed at Galveston to date. A similar fate befell the
San Pedro facility improvement plan.
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Table 17—Facilities Improvement Programs Contemplated and
Their Present Status for Each Major U.S.
Shipbuilder
Avondale Shipyards (Ogden Corp.)
Contemplated : Plans for large drydock and methods for
construction of LNG ships.
Status ; Avondale is spending an estimated $42 million in
capital improvements primarily for LNG construction
facilities. The three- to five-position shipway, used for
the destroyer escort program, has been reconstructed to
two large positions to accommodate the LNG program.
Additional buildings and equipment to supplement the
yard's mechanized handling and fabrication systems are
also part of the current expansion program.
Bath Iron Works (Congoleum Inc.)
Contemplated ; General facilities improvement program, steel
storage, crane ways and building ways.
Status : The $14 million modernization program has been
completed. The upgrading of facilities included the
reconstruction of two shipways to accommodate ships of
700 feet in length and 130 foot beam, the installation of
a 200-ton level luffing crane with sufficient outreach
to erect units on all shipways, and new steel fabrication
and assembly shope and equipment that will double the




Bethlehem Steel Co. Sparrows Point Shipyard
Contemplated : General facilities expansion and upgrading
for the construction of VLCC ships.
Status ; To provide the capability for the construction of
VLCC vessels, Sparrows Point has completed a significant
facilities improvement program totalling approximately $30
million. The major components of this modernization program
are a new large building basin for the construction of vessels
up to 300,000 deadweight tons and a new panel shop for
fabrication of steel. Other recent improvements include a
numerically-controlled gas-cutting machine and automated
plate and shape blasting/painting equipment. Since the
basin is expected to be used solely for new construction,
the yard does not have a drydocking facility; therefore
repair capacity is limited to topside and inboard work.
General Dynamics—Electric Boat Division
Contemplated ; New level land erection facility and launching
complex for SSN 688 and Trident nuclear submarine construction
Status ; An approximately $150 million facilities improvement
program is in process at the Electric Boat Division. The
Groton site improvements are principally in the Land Level
Construction Facility (LLCF) consisting of an inshore
erection area; an outboard erection site; and a graving dock




for late 1976. Other improvements at Groton are the nuclear
trade support building, the graving dock trade support
building and the major components assembly building, of
which most are scheduled for full occupancy in early 1976.
At the Quonset Point facility, improvements are underway
in buildings to be used for steel processing and fabrication,
housing various shops and material storage areas.
General Dynamics—Quincy Shipyard
Contemplated : Construction of two new building basins and
other facilities for construction of LNG vessels.
Status : To provide the tools and facilities to efficiently
build LNG tankers in series production, General Dynamics
has completed a major improvement and modernization program
totalling $40 million, of which approximately $23 million
has been expended since mid-1974. In addition to the
conversion of two conventional sliding ways to large building
basins, other improvements at Quincy include: a steel
fabrication facility, materials handling equipment, a 250-ton
transporter, a plate cleaning and blasting facility,
automated steel flame planer, stripper and cutter equipment
and a 1200-ton Goliath crane, the largest in the western
hemisphere, installed for transferring the spherical LNG
tanks from barges on which they will be delivered to the




FMC Shipyard (FMC Corporation)
Contemplated : Facilities modernization for modular
construction.
Status : To expand its shipbuilding capability to include
construction of oceangoing ships, FMC has expended $5.7
million for the acquisition of 23 acres of land adjacent
to its existing facility, the purchase of a 200-ton whirley
crane, new welding equipment, a thousand-ton press, and a
computer-operated steel plate cutting machine.
Ingalls Shipbuilding (Litton Industries)
Contemplated : Completion of the new automated west bank
yard and a new nuclear overhaul facility and modernization
of the piers at the east bank yard.
Status : The new 611 acre advanced automated west bank
shipyard was completed for approximately $130 million. This
complex includes the first combat systems land-based test
and integration facility provided by a private shipbuilder.
The east bank nuclear support and pier facilities have been
modernized and expanded and improved materials handling
equipment has been installed.
Lockheed Shipbuilding & Construction (Lockheed Aircraft)





Status ; Shipway #21 expansion and additional crane
facilities have been completed.
National Steel & Shipbuilding (Kaiser Industries)
Contemplated : General expansion of present shipbuilding
facilities for the construction of 150,000 deadweight ton
tankers and 125,000 cubic meter LNG ships.
Status : During 1975 NASSCO expended $13 million on its
current expansion and modernization program. Capital
expenditures of $8.6 million are planned for 1976. In the
new graving dock, NASSCO can produce ships up to 1000 feet
by 170 feet, compared to a previous maximum size of 900
feet by 106 feet. A new outfitting pier and additional
mechanized steel handling and fabricating facilities are
also included in the current program.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. (Tenneco)
Contemplated : Planned new commercial shipyard of
approximately 150 acres with new graving dock and accessory
platen and crane facilities.
Status : Approximately $180 million has been committed for
the development of a new commercial shipyard scheduled for
completion in 1976. A new building basin 1600 feet long,
250 feet wide and 44 feet deep is near completion. In




second can be built simultaneously. Supporting platens,
a steel assembly shop, a 900-ton Goliath gantry crane, and
two outfitting berths have also been constructed.
Additional support facilities for this new yard include
more computers and storage areas.
Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. (Seatrain Lines, Inc.)
Contemplated : General facilities improvement and
modernization of large portions of the former New York
Naval Shipyard for construction of 225,000 deadweight
ton tankers.
Status : In 1969, Seatrain leased facilities of the former
New York Naval Shipyard to build 225,000 dwt tankers on an
assembly-line basis. Although the facilities that existed
in 1969 included three large fabricating buildings and two
massive graving docks to accommodate a maximum ship size
of 1094 feet by 143.5 feet, Seatrain has expended $40
million on reactivation. The emphasis in this program
has been mechanization and automation which is widely used
throughout the yard in its steel processing, module
operations, and a prototype adjustable work platform.
Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. (Sun Oil Co.)
Contemplated : Construction of a new facility for construction
of LNG tankers or ships up to 400,000 dwt and general




Status ; When completed in 1976, the current $42 million
capital improvement program will provide Sun with a new
level "shipbuilding platform," a two-section floating
drydock capable of lifting 70,000 tons, a 1100 foot
outfitting pier, a new plate burning facility and other
shipbuilding support facilities. Portions of the new
building basin have been delayed.
Todd Shipyards
Contemplated : Construction of a new shipyard adjacent to
the existing Galveston facility for construction of 380,000
dwt vessels, land level construction site and large floating
drydock with new launching facilities. Expansion of
shipways, new cranes, and modernization of the San Pedro
facilities.
Status : Todd, as a result of financial difficulties, has
halted all expansion plans at the Galveston site. All that
has been completed is the purchase of the adjoining land.
No construction facilities exist at the Galveston site.
Also, as a result of cancellations for eight 89,700 dwt
tankers, has scaled down its facilities expansion program
at their San Pedro yard. The rebuilding and enlarging
of its two shipbuilding ways has been halted; but the
company is completing the other aspects of the program,




heavy lift capabilities, outfitting and related production
improvements. These improvements will be needed for the
recently awarded Navy patrol frigate shipbuilding contract
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The following points are significant in examining this
performance:
1. All of the major merchant shipbuilders had developed
strategies and announced programs for facility improvement
and expansion directed primarily toward the opening market
for large tanker and LNG ships. These were based upon bright
expectations for the shipbuilding market.
2. Subsequent to announcement of these programs, for
reasons discussed earlier, the merchant shipbuilding market
suffered a severe downturn, and the future is still
uncertain.
3. Due to the downturn and severe inflation in
production costs, many shipbuilding contracts were reduced
or cancelled. Review of the corporate annual reports
indicates that during this time almost all of the major
shipbuilders suffered losses on existing contracts. Todd
reported losses in profits and working capital for three
of the past five years [62]
.
4. The major Naval shipbuilders, primarily Newport News
and Litton, also were incurring severe losses in their Naval
contracts and carrying substantial claims against the
government during this period.
Nonetheless, Todd was the only major shipbuilder that
was unable to achieve substantial progress on its announced
facilities improvement program. The larger, diversified
shipbuilding companies were able to support their programs
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in the face of adverse economic conditions. This suggests
an influence of the conglomerates in maintaining strong
facility improvement programs. This is further confirmed
by review of some cases cited in business literature.
Bath Iron Works (conglomerate) needed capital for
facilities expansion to give its shipyard the capability
to construct merchant vessels. Merger with Congoleum and
other home furnishings companies generated the needed
capital [7 and 36] .
General Dynamics (defense contractor) experienced near
financial chaos in the late 1960s due to major losses in its
data products, missile, civilian aircraft, and surface
shipbuilding activities. The company was forced to shrink
its business to a profitable core— its financial survival
owed to other defense-related products which showed a
profit [22]
.
Tenneco (conglomerate) needed a large amount of funds
for expansion and modernization throughout the company,
including $100-$200 million for improvements to their
Newport News Shipbuilding facilities to build LNG tankers.
Through manipulations of their vast and diverse conglomerate
assets, the funds were raised without issuance of additional
stock [1]
.
Litton (conglomerate) had acquired the Ingalls Shipbuilding
facility in 1961. When the Navy changed its procurement
methods to the "company-design total package procurement
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basis" Litton sensed a rare opportunity to employ its
large diversified base and technology expertise. Financing
for the project was novel in that the State of Mississippi
issued $130 million worth of tax-exempt revenue bonds
to build the yard and then leased it to Litton. The State
issue of the bonds was made possible largely through the
stability, diversity, and opportunity of Litton Industries,
which is financial guarantor of the bonds. Litton
constructed the most modern shipyard in the U.S. with
highly automated equipment for the revolutionary
modularized production-line approach to shipbuilding. The
savings anticipated from the new production techniques
were a major factor in Litton' s being awarded all of the
total-package procurement contracts [38]
.
It appears, therefore, that the diversified nature
of the conglomerate affords some advantages over large,
single-industry firms in supporting facilities programs.
B. Discussion
The ability of the conglomerate-controlled shipbuilders
to maintain active facility improvement and expansion programs
can be directly attributed to the larger capital base upon
which they have to draw. From Table 18 it is easy to see
the orders-of-magnitude difference in financial base
between Todd, for instance, and the large corporations.
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larger financial base, however, do not derive solely from
the conglomerate-type of busines structure; for many of the
same influences are found for firms such as General
Dynamics or Sun Oil which cannot be classed as conglomerates.
In other words, the influence of conglomeration on the
shipbuilding industry, with regard to capital improvement,
stem from its characteristics of "bigness" as well as
diversification.
Some influential factors felt to derive from
"bigness" (as compared to smaller, single-product companies)
are:
1. the ability to embark upon larger capital expansion
programs;
2. less lead time for availability of funds;
3. better credit;
4. cheaper funds;
5. less risk because of larger base; and
6. subsidization from other corporate products.
It is felt that in addition to these, the conglomerates
have brought to the shipbuilding industry other important
features. Some of these are:
1. subsidization of working capital and funds for
facilities improvement from other industries in
which the conglomerate is active;




3. less risk in expansion programs due to larger and
broader capital base;
4. better capital rationing and planning; and
5. greater access to capital markets.
These derive primarily from the diversified nature of the
conglomerate. For instance, during a period such as the
last few years, when production of weapons systems and
aircraft have fallen off, defense contractors such as
Lockheed or General Dynamics are less flexible than a
multi-industry conglomerate such as Tenneco. Another
example is Bath Iron Works (Congoleum Corp.) which is of
comparable financial size as Todd, yet its diversification
has enabled it to proceed with expansion in the face of
the same economic factors as Todd.
C. Summary
It can be said that the presence of large corporations
in the U.S. shipbuilding industry affords a greater
capability for the industry to keep pace with its changing
market and technology. It is further suggested that
conglomeration has brought more flexibility in this
investment capability and enhanced the survivability of
some shipyards which had previously had only marginal future
prospects (for example, the acquisition of Ingalls Shipyard
by Litton and the subsequent addition of a nuclear
capability and an entirely new, modern shipyard) . The
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conglomerate-controlled shipyards have demonstrated a
flexibility in market strategy through their ability to
expand and modernize facilities to gain large market shares
in both Naval and merchant shipbuilding, rather than in
just one or the other. In this regard, it is interesting
to note that all of the conglomerate-controlled shipyards,
with the exception of FMC, were acquired while engaged in
large Navy shipbuilding programs. Subsequent facility
improvement programs have been directed toward construction
of merchant shipbuilding facilities. The large, highly
diversified shipbuilders have also demonstrated the
tendency to take the risk of large capital expenditure
programs for facility improvements, whereas a one-product
or one-industry company might be unwilling to go ahead
with that size capital investment which would be large
for it proportionately.
6.2 Organizational Structure
A characteristic change which has occurred to the
conglomerate-acquired shipyards has been in their
transformation from independent business entities to a
segment of a division in the widely-diversified conglomerate
structure. This has had several manifestations in the
shipbuilding industry. First, at least one other level is
added in major management decisionmaking. Many major
business decisions may not be made at the local shipyard
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management level, but referred to absentee top corporate
management, whether it be a division vice-president or
financial vice-president, or the like. This can be
beneficial from the view of the conglomerate management
because they have a broader overall view of the corporate
situation and may best appraise the shipyard decisions
within the overall corporate plans and policy. This can be
viewed as a constraint by the shipyard or the customer
because of increased time for the decisions and the
additional encumbering executive level for customers to
deal with, especially in matters of dollar-schedule
performance. This last concern has been expressed by
numerous DOD and Navy officials in reference to Naval
shipbuilding contracts. In effect the added management
organization above the shipyard management may take the
shipbuilding out of the hands of the shipbuilder.
Secondly, the corporate top management may well be
less aware of, or less sensitive to, local circumstances
of both an intra-shipyard and community nature.
Thirdly, the addition of the conglomerate
hierarchy above the shipyard management organization has
seemed to induce a higher level of active relationship in
Naval shipbuilding. For instance, relationships which had
previously been between the shipbuilder and the Navy's
Supervisor of the Shipbuilding or Ship Acquisition Project
Manager have tended to rise to higher levels in the
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conglomerate management and the Department of the Navy or
Department of Defense. It is suggested that this elevation
of working relationships tends to cause a breakdown in
lower-level decisionmaking. It might be said that some
conglomerates have tried to work at the level in government
at which they are most likely to get their way.
6. 3 Management Philosophy and Expertise
Another characteristic change which has taken place
in the conglomerate-acquired shipyards has been in the
basic nature of their management and management philosophy.
Generally, with their acquisition by conglomerate firms,
the shipbuilders have become more sophisticated in their
management techniques and in their relations with customers.
To the point of view of the customer, either government
or civilian, they are now dealing with more than just a
shipbuilding-expert firm. They are dealing with an
organization operated and controlled by management-oriented
managers (instead of shipbuilding technical managers) with
more sensitivity to, and emphasis on, financial performance.
The following factors are felt to be significant to this
change
.
1. Some of the private shipyards are now run by legal,
financial, and contract experts instead of technical
managers. The new managers are skilled and experienced
in public relations, financial manipulations and government
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dealings, and may not be interested in ships per se but only
in making a profit. Bath Iron Works and Newport News are
two instances in which conglomeration brought a new chief
executive with no previous shipbuilding experience. Before
he took over Bath in 1967, William Kyle had been an
entrepreneur. He was forever starting companies, building
them up, and selling them at a profit. After he bought into
Bath, he felt that the management was living in a dream
world, not making a good profit. After a loss year in 1966,
he seized control and began conglomeration of his own [7].
Shortly after Tenneco acquired Newport News Shipbuilding,
L. C. "Bud" Ackerman was installed as a director and president
of the shipyard. Ackerman literally did not know the bow
from the stern of a ship; his past experience had been in
oil, distilling, and auto equipment [43]
.
2. Conglomerates have brought to their acquired
shipyards more sophisticated managers and management
techniques. To generalize the comments of Newport News's
Ackerman, the shipyards had considerable technical skills,
but the thrust of their managers was the management of
those skills instead of the management of management and
business [43] . Consequently, in addition to the personal
management expertise of the new executive, the tools of
the sophisticated corporate management were brought to
the shipyard. Continuing with Newport News as the example,
Ackerman and Tenneco brought in management information
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systems and controls, greater utilization of computers to
run the complex business and long-range planning systems,
among other techniques. Executives from Avondale (Ogden)
,
Ingalls (Litton) , Bath (Congoleum) , NASSCO (Kaiser) , and
FMC Shipyards report similar changes in their cases [66,
Vol. 2] . This is not to say that, in the cases where
top management has been replaced, the new management is
"better" or "worse"; just that it is "different".
3. Shipbuilding has been recognized in the past as
being a parochial business with firmly entrenched traditions
and resistance to change. Some feel that conglomerates
have removed this characteristic by using new methods
and ideas and a broadened management perspective [43].
4. There has been a significant change in the
emphasis of the conglomerate-acquired shipyards' business
philosophy from shipbuilding technical expertise and
quality to financial status and profitability. This
results to a large degree from the overall conglomerate
corporate policies, which are highly motivated by
strictly financial considerations, and the nature and
experience of newly installed shipyard chief executives.
Whether or not the shipyard top management is actually
replaced, there is still a more financially-oriented
assessment of shipyard management performance by their
corporate superiors. As a result, the shipbuilders have
been more aggressive in seeking improved rates of profit.
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The end result of these types of change to the
management philosophy of the conglomerate-controlled
shipyards has had an impact upon the nature of the shipyards 1
relationship with its customers. It appears that this
impact has been much less disruptive in the commercial
market than in the naval shipbuilding market, especially
in view of the controversies which have arisen. Some Navy
officials have expressed the feeling that the conglomerate
shipyard management lacks attention to shipbuilding
technical detail, quality, and timeliness, and is
interested in shipbuilding solely for the impact upon the
corporate balance sheet. Much of this may be true in view
of the explicit policy changes in Newport News as well
as other conglomerate-acquired shipyardsv The shipbuilders
assert that they cannot realize reasonable profits from
Navy shipbuilding as they can in the commercial market;
consequently some (such as Avondale) have withdrawn from
the Naval market in favor of merchant shipbuilding.
Concerning the commercial customers, it is especially
interesting to note that the capital investment programs
of the conglomerate-controlled shipyards have been
very heavily directed towards expansion of facilities
for production of commercial vessels, rather than Naval.
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6.4 Navy Shipbuilding Claims
Contractor claims for price increases on Navy
shipbuilding contracts are not a new phenomenon. Yet, since
1967 the claims problem has escalated from relative
obscurity to one of major national proportion. It has been
alleged by some that the genesis of the recent claims problem
began some years ago when the large conglomerate
corporations began to acquire control of the major
shipbuilding companies in the U.S. This writer's analysis
of the situation yields no justification for such a strong
statement of causality. Of particular interest to this
study is the fact that the recent claims escalation and
the rise to dominance in the U.S. shipbuilding industry
of the conglomerates have occurred over roughly the same
time period.
A. Background
In the past decade, every major shipbuilder involved
in the Navy's shipbuilding programs has submitted claims.
Most of the claims arose under fixed-priced contracts
awarded in the 1960s under the Total Package Procurement
policy. This policy employed formally-advertised
fixed-priced contracts for all phases of ship procurement,
including research and development. Prior to that time,
the Navy allocated its new ship construction to private
shipyards based upon available facilities, and used
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negotiated fixed-priced contracts which made allowance
for the particular facilities and circumstances of the
shipbuilder involved. Additionally, in the past, the
fixed-price contracts were used only for procurement of
ships with relatively firm specifications and ordinarily
awarded cost- or incentive-type contracts for cases
involving significant unknowns. The cost- or incentive-type
contracts were flexible enough to absorb increased costs
due to unanticipated developmental problems or changes
without restorting to claims. Standard disputes clauses of
these earlier contracts also provided a fairly efficient
means for equitable resolution of emergent claims.
The transition of contracting procedures is but one
aspect of the general causes of the claim problem and should
be put in~~p~roper historical perspective [51, Appendix D] .
By 1960 the Navy's destroyer and auxiliary forces were
becoming overaged and obsolete, especially in relation to
the rapidly expanding Soviet fleet. Consequently, a
large-scale building program was undertaken. The surge
of Navy shipbuilding work literally flooded a U.S.
shipbuilding industry that was in most respects ill-prepared
for the large production demands. Shipyards which had
experienced a normal backlog of three to five Navy ships now
faced backlogs of twenty or more by the late 1960s (Avondale
and Lockheed, for example) . This strain put upon the industry
to provide efficient production, sufficient facilities, and
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trained personnel was further compounded by the "technology
jump" of the ships' sophisticated weapons and electronics
systems.
At the period of the late 1950s and early 1960s when
the large Navy shipbuilding program was established, the
American economy was in a recession. The excess capacity
and pool of skilled workers could be effectively used for
the very initial program phases. During this turn-around
period, prices remained relatively stable and manpower
available. Many ships were completed with only minor
claims activity (pre-1965) . Also during the period of
fairly stable prices came the major Department of Defense
weapons systems acquisitions policy changes of Secretary
McNamara. The previous policies of allocations to shipyards
and negotiated fixed-price contracts, which assured most
major shipyards of some business, were replaced by the
formally-advertised fixed-price contracting of the CF/CD
policy which has been described earlier. The buyer's
market induced intense competition and "pencil-sharpening"
to be the lowest bidder and win award of contracts for a
large number of vessels. The bidding proceeded at a time
of relative price stability and available manpower.
Further, it was thought that new production methods (such
as the automated shipyard of Litton) would increase
productivity. What resulted was exceedingly low bid
awards, especially on the DE-1052 contracts, and a
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tremendous commitment to further contracts, especially
by Litton.
By the time a major commitment had been made by the
shipbuilding industry in either actual production or
towards other contracts, the economic slack was gone. The
increased demand and other effects of the escalating Vietnam
war brought on inflation along with stiff competition for
skilled manpower. As the war peaked in the late 1960s, the
inefficiencies inherent in training a large inexperienced
workforce, difficulties encountered in expanding production
facilities to meet the increasing demand and spiralling
inflation all wreaked havoc upon the Naval shipbuilders.
Many of the shipbuilders had incurred significant losses
due, they felt, to factors beyond their control.
Nevertheless, the additional cost effects of war, manpower
shortages, inflation and "buy-in" are not compensable under
government contract law. Thus is the emergence of the
enormous amount of "delay and disruption" and "constructive
change" claims.
B. Status of shipbuilding claims
Tables 19 through 22 review the development and current
status of shipbuilding claims [20, 21 and 2, p. 3-8] . These
show how significant the escalation in claims has been and
that the conglomerates account for most of the major
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shipbuilding claims submitted, especially for Newport
News (Tenneco) and Litton.
Table 19—Shipbuilding Claims Submitted, 1967-1976
Claims Received
Net Claims
AdjustmentYear Number Amount Total
1967 4 $ 39.1 Mil ' — $ 39.1 Mil
1968 17 121.0 $ 55.0 Mil 176.0
1969 25 336.9 71.3 408.2
1970 16 116.6 40.7 157.3
1971 31 405.1 8.6 413.7
1972 5 280.0 2.7 282.7
1973 3 179.4 (3.6) 175.8
1974 1 10.0 32.4 42.4




Shipbuilders often adjust the value of their claims against
the Navy after initial submission.
C. Claims settlement procedure
Claims may be disposed of in four ways: (1) settlement
between the parties; (2) unilateral contracting officer's
decision; (3) withdrawal by the contractor; or (4) rejection
of the claim by the contracting officer.
Upon submission of a claim by a contractor it is
referred to a claims team composed of personnel with
expertise in the technical, legal, business, accounting,









Table 20— Shipbuilding Claims Submitted Over $1 Million By
Shipbuilder, 1967-1976 (to 30 June)
Shipbuilder
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Table 21—Shipbuilding Claims Over
as of 30 June 1976
Million on Hand
Shipbuild er Ship Arr.ount Date Submitted




























Table 22—Armed Services Board of Contract Apoeals (ASBCa)






















*This appeal suspended by agreement of the parties to
attemnt to reach a negotiated settlement
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the claims team is to develop facts concerning the claim,
to document such facts and to apply legal and business
principles so as to develop a legal and logical position
for a negotiated resolution or for litigation in the event
that a negotiated resolution does not occur.
The claim is segregated into its various elements,
e.g. each constructive change, delays, suspensions, late
GFP or GFL, etc. This is known as "scoping the claim."
Each team member evaluates that portion of the claim which
falls within his expertise. Upon completion of these
evaluations, the findings of the team members are
consolidated for review. As part of the evaluation
process, corollary investigations are conducted to ascertain
facts which have a significant bearing on the claim but
which might be excluded from the contractor's submission.
Such corollary investigations would include (1) review
of contract formation background to determine particularly
or peculiarly known situations at the outset of contract
award and at initiation of contract performance; (2) overall
contract performance; (3) known problems experienced during
contract performance; (4) review of contractor's accounting
records to determine, to the extent practicable, actual
costs relating to claim elements; and (5) review of
contractor's production records to determine responsibility,
to the extent feasible, for the claim element.
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The claims team, as a whole, develops positions
with respect to (1) minimum entitlement, assuming all areas
are resolved against the contractor; (2) maximum entitlement,
assuming all questionable areas are resolved against the
Government; and (3) degree of questionable areas.
Negotiations are attempted within the range of the
minimum and maximum entitlement levels. If negotiations
result in the inability to reach a settlement within the
given upper and lower levels, a contracting officer's
decision is written at the minimum entitlement level.
Depending upon the size of the claim, the negotiation
process and final claim award occur at various organizational
levels. Should the shipbuilder not accept the final Navy
disposition of the claim, he may appeal to either the
Armed Forces Board of Contract Appeals (AFBCA) or the U.S.
Court of Claims [51, p. 49].
D. Causes of claims
From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the
actual causes of shipbuilding claims present a very complex
question. However, the claims submitted by a shipbuilder
must be based upon specific government action or inaction
causing additional costs. Specific shipbuilding claims
against the government are based primarily upon the theory
of "constructive change" which is roughly defined as any
conduct of a contracting officer or his agent, other than
formal change orders or supplemental agreements, which
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has the effect of prescribing new or different work than
required under the contract [63] . Studies have been made
to identify the causes of claims. Below are discussed the
primary causes cited [20 and 21]
.
1. Late and inaccurate lead-yard working plans
Often ships of the same class are constructed by more
than one shipbuilder. In these circumstances, one
shipbuilder, called the lead-yard, is selected to construct
the first ship of the class and to provide the detailed
working plans to other shipbuilders, called follow-yards.
If the working plans are inaccurate, the contractor must
revise the plans before proceeding with construction.
Late working plans can delay and obstruct the construction
effort; thus increasing contractor costs.
2. Inadequate specifications
Specifications contain detail technical requirements
for ship construction and describe details concerning
equipment to be installed. Defective or misleading Navy
specifications have been a continuing factor in shipbuilders 1
claim submissions. According to shipbuilders, defective
specifications resulted in additional costs because new
specifications had to be prepared to replace defective
ones. This took more time and cost more money than was
originally estimated. Contractors allege they have had
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to rip out and redo completed work found to be unacceptable
because of defects in specifications.
3. Defective and late delivery of Government-furnished
equipment and technical information
In its shipbuilding contracts the Navy agrees to
provide the contractor with various equipment for
installation on ships when this is deemed to be in the
best interest of the Government. When equipment or
technical information is delivered late, shipbuilders'
construction schedules and delivery dates may be affected.
By the same token, when equipment is defective rework is
required which, in turn, interrupts the shipbuilders'
schedules for fabricating and installing supporting
structures and service systems for the equipment.
4. Unanticipated increases in quality assurance requirements
The Navy and its contractors disagreed over whether
the contractors could have reasonably been expected to
anticipate and allow for increases in quality assurance
requirements. On contracts let in the 1960s, the contractors'
viewpoints have been that the Navy increased its
requirements to a greater extent than anticipated. Navy
officials feel that quality assurance problems occurred
because of Navy attempts to eliminate laxity in enforcing
requirements spelled out in the contract. In any event,
quality assurance claims are often filed under the category
of excessive and erroneous inspections.
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5. Indiscriminate use of verbal constructive change orders
Constructive change orders are changes not formally
issued in writing; however, they have the effect of formal
changes because they require the contractor to perform
work different from, and in addition to, that prescribed
by the original terms of the contract. These changes
include verbal changes directed by inspectors and other Navy
officials stationed at shipyards to oversee contractors'
work. Shipbuilders contend that verbal constructive
change orders are costly and have far-reaching effects
because changes made by the economies and efficiencies
involved in the construction of the entire ship. Navy
officials contend that in some cases the constructive change
orders are used as an excuse for recovery of unrelated
losses.
6. Inability of the Navy and its contractors to promptly
identify and settle contract disputes
According to Navy procurement officials, one of the
major causes of claims has been the inability of either
the Navy or contractors to identify potential requirements
for contract price adjustments at an early stage and the
lack of procedures to settle issues when they are small
and knowledge of surrounding factors is current. Contractors




7. Improper acquisition techniques
Much of the blame for the claims problem has been
placed upon past excessive use of fixed-price contracts
which often required the contractor to accept too many
unknowns, particularly under procurements involving
concurrent development and production. Many feel that these
contracts of the Total-Package procurement policy did not
provide enough flexibility in contract price to compensate
contractors for unanticipated development and production
problems. In addition, contracts often did not provide
for a rate of inflation which shipbuilders experienced.
8. Underpriced contracts
Seriously underpriced fixed-price contracts are
another factor cited as contributing to claims. Many
reasons are given for underpriced contracts, including
so-called buy-ins by contractors during the 1960s when
competition was keen and contractors allegedly purposely
bid low in order to obtain Navy work. Unrealistically low
bids are also attributed to the contractor's inadequate
assessments of the technical risks involved in ship
procurements
.
9. Delay and disruption due to changes
A large portion of constructive change claims is
attributed to the "ripple effect" or synergy in the effects
of multiple changes. In some cases, many compensable acts
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taken together have an effect on cost that is greater than
the totality of these acts if the cost effect of each act
is analyzed separately. The administration and control of
changes by the government has been marked by delays in the
decisionmaking process which, coupled with the policy of
pre-pricing changes, causes delays in the issuance of
necessary change orders. Further, changes have been
excessive, especially under the CF/CD procurement policy.
10. Contractors' inefficiencies resulting in
additional costs
Contrary to the previously cited causes of claims which
relate to acquisition program deficiencies is the charge that
some claims have been submitted to recover contractor-
responsible costs. These include losses due to contractor
inefficiencies and costs to subsidize previous losses and
non-Navy work. Unsupported and even fraudulent claims have
been charged to the point of Justice Department investigations
being initiated.
E. Claims and conglomeration
From the foregoing it can be seen that conglomerates
have been deeply involved in the claims issue since its
escalation in 1967. Further, it has been verified that
(1) the development of the current claims problem has
occurred during a period in which conglomerate-controlled
shipyards have increasingly dominated the U.S. shipbuilding
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industry in facilities and output; and (2) conglomerate-
controlled shipbuilders have accounted for an extremely
large share of the claims submitted. These factors,
however, are probably correlative rather than causitive.
In fact, considering the amount and complexity of Naval
shipbuilding work performed by the conglomerate-controlled
shipbuilders, one might logically expect the second
statement.
Although it is indeed not the intent here to explore
the question of the cause of the shipbuilding claims problem,
it is fair to say that Total-Package procurement played no
small role. In the mind of the author, the influence of
these acquisition policies and their economic environment
so dominate the claims issue that they largely obscure
identification of the impact of conglomeration, in and of
itself. There are, however, some factors of conglomeration
in the shipbuilding industry which are felt to have been
of some influence.
1. As mentioned previously, many of the conglomerates
brought to their acquired shipyards a new type of
management expertise and management techniques such as
planning, cost analysis, and management information systems.
These have enabled shipyard management to become better aware
of their production costs. Additionally, and probably more
importantly, the information systems have also made the
senior corporate management more aware of costs and shipyard
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management performance. It is suggested that the greater
cost awareness of both conglomerate and shipyard management
and the high financial priorities of conglomerate management
have brought both pressure on, and the greater ability of,
shipyard management to avail themselves of claims to
recover losses.
2. It is suggested that the conglomerate-controlled
shipyards are better able to survive and press claims
litigation. This derives from two major factors brought to
the acquired shipyard by the conglomerate. First, the
conglomerate typically has available the service of a large,
capable corporate legal staff. Additionally, the value of
this legal staff is enhanced by specialized Washington law
firms that help prepare and prosecute claims against the
government. Instances have been cited where senior
engineering and other technical talent were assigned to
work full-time over extended periods in developing the
background and justification for masses of paper to be
submitted to the government as part of the contractor's
formal claim procedure [67, Vol. 3, p. 1262-1356]. Secondly,
the large financial base of the diversified conglomerate
gives the shipbuilder the ability to financially survive
the claims litigation period which has typically extended
to two or more years. Without the funds source, the
shipbuilder would be less able to negotiate claims to its
advantage for fear of financial chaos brought on by having
to "carry" a large claim for a long period.
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3. Throughout the evolution of the claims problem,
the conglomerates have, to a large extent, led the way in
the prosecution of shipbuilding claims. During this
period, claims processing techniques for the contractors,
the Navy and the Department of Defense, and the legal
principles in government contract law were developed. The
leadership exercised by the conglomerate-controlled
shipbuilders helped to create an atmosphere of ever-growing
acceptance of the claim as a viable business tool. It can
be said that largely through the example of the conglomerates,
shipbuilding claims had become almost fashionable during
the early 1970s, being used by all major shipbuilding
contractors.
4. The allegations of "creative accounting" are
frequently heard in relation to business organizations.
They are not just directed at the large conglomerate
business, but cross the broad spectrum of business
organization. Such is also the case in the shipbuilding
industry. In relation to shipbuilding claims against the
government, testimony before the House Seapower Subcommittee
in 1974 charged that shipbuilders submitted claims based on
tenuous documentation in order to enhance the financial
appearance of the company [67, Vol. 3, p. 1292]. Certainly,
it cannot be said that such practices are indigenous to
conglomerate organizations; however, the specific case has
been attributed to them. In effect what happens is that
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such a claim can be included as an asset in the financial
statements; thus postponing a loss on a shipbuilding
contract. The shipbuilder cannot continue this charade
once he settles his claim, but if he is in a loss position
on a contract, it is to his advantage with this kind of
accounting to delay settlement of claims until a more
advantageous time in the future. It is one way that
profits can be reported to stockholders at the same time
complaints of losses are made to the Navy. This can be an
especially effective technique to show a rapid profit
turnaround after acquisition of a shipyard by a conglomerate
F. Summary
It is the general conclusion here that conglomeration
in the U.S. shipbuilding industry was not a primary
motivating force for the recent claims problem; although
it was a contributing and possibly an aggravating influence.
This influence has been manifest in an apparent greater
propensity of conglomerate-controlled shipyards to
exercise claims due to a greater resource base of both
manpower and financing, and their high financial priorities.
This is to say that it appears that the conglomerates are
more ready, willing and able to prosecute claims. Also, it
is felt that the apparent leadership of such firms in
prosecuting claims against the government has contributed
to claims activity of other shipbuilders.
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6.5 Power and Influence
Over the past fifteen years, the conglomerate-acquired
shipbuilders have gained control of a large segment of the
U.S. shipbuilding industry. Part of their control is
reflected in the number and market share of these shipyards.
Review of the earlier chapter on market characteristics
shows that on January 1, 1976, the conglomerate-controlled
shipyards represented six of the twelve active major
shipbuilders of merchant ships with 60% of the market
tonnage, and four of the six active major Naval shipbuilders
with 7 5% of the market tonnage. Three of the top four merchant
shipbuilders are conglomerate-controlled. From these data
it is apparent that the conglomerates have great dominance
in the Naval shipbuilding market sector. This is
particularly evident in the rise in conglomerate market
share from 49% to 75% in the past ten years and in their
control of special industry capabilities. Conglomerate-
controlled shipyards represent two of the three (Newport
News, Litton, and Electric Boat) U.S. shipyards capable
of building nuclear submarines, as well as the only U.S.
shipyard (Newport News) presently capable of building
nuclear surface ships. The degree of their dominance
affords the conglomerates a source of power and influence




The conglomerates have also gained power in the
shipbuilding industry through the business and political
spheres. Again this has been particularly true for the
shipbuilders' largest customer, the U.S. government.
Due to the inherent diversity and financial position, the
conglomerate top management and their shipyard representatives
would tend to have vast resources of influence and
associations within business and government circles.
Lobbying organizations such as the Shipbuilders' Council
of America also reflect the views of their conglomerate
members. They have developed influence within national
politics through their nature as large corporations, their
impact upon local economic and employment considerations
and, in the past, through substantial campaign contributions.
The top officials of the Department of Defense (DOD)
and the Maritime Administration are the primary national
shipbuilding policymakers. Most of these positions are
filled by Presidential appointment with the confirmation
of Congress. The DOD is run at the top by political
appointees who generally are chosen from the defense
industry and who return to industry after a few years of
government service. The industry representatives often
have the ear of many of these DOD officials; therefore, it
is not surprising that defense officials may have an industry
slant in their views. Such an influence may have existed
in the Total-Package Procurement contract awards in the
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1960s through the association of Mr. Roy Ash and Mr. Robert
McNamara. Mr. Ash was chairman of Litton Industries at the
time Mr. McNamara was Secretary of Defense in the mid-1960s.
Furthermore, during testimony before the Senate Subcommittee
on Priorities and Economy in Government (1973) , Mr. Roy Ash
was sharply criticized for his role in the negotiations with
the Navy of Litton 's LHA shipbuilding claims. It had
already been announced that Mr. Ash would be leaving Litton
to assume new duties as the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget [64, p. 1916].
Thus, the conglomerates have gained power and influence
within the shipbuilding industry because of their number,
market share and shipbuilding capabilities, especially in
Naval shipbuilding. Their power and influence has in many
ways been exercised with the industry's primary customer, the
federal government, through business and political strength
both outside as well as within the primary shipbuilding
policy and regulatory agencies. It is fair to say, then,
that the conglomerates potentially have the power and
can exert the influence to affect many aspects important to
the industry, such as MarAd subsidy policy, Navy
procurement policies and decisions, claims settlements,
internal DOD relations and other political and business
matters. Their leverage may predominantly express their
own self-interests; however, it must also increase the




A characteristic change which occurs upon acquisition
of a company by a conglomerate is the consolidation of its
financial reports into the larger corporate reports. This
has been the case with many previously independent shipyards.
Todd Shipyards is now the only major shipyard which makes
independent financial reports. The primary impact of
this change has been upon the procurement of Naval vessels
because shipyard financial statistics are no longer
available and because of the low reliability of the
corporate shipyard statistics reported.
Much has been said by shipbuilders to the effect that,
on Navy shipbuilding at least, profits are low and going
lower [67, Vol. 2], Presumably the figures quoted by the
shipbuilding executives are taken from financial reports
such as annual reports. The financial information
contained in these reports is not only relied upon by
investors and creditors, but also plays an important role
in defense procurement. Major shipbuilders cite figures
from their reports in efforts to negotiate higher shipbuilding
subsidies, higher shipbuilding profits on new orders, to
obtain more favorable claims settlements, or to change
procurement policies. In some cases, these figures are
accepted without question, not recognizing how profits are
calculated or how figures are manipulated or that neither
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the Navy nor the Defense Contract Audit Agency have access
to the financial books and records to verify the numbers.
Given the importance of the corporate financial
reports to the economy as a whole , and also to Navy ship
procurement, it would be expected that the figures in these
reports accurately reflect the results of the company's
operations and its overall financial condition. However,
there is great latitude in the accounting for costs and
profits. As a result, the figures are susceptible to
manipulation and judgment which can dramatically change
reported profits, all within the constraints of "generally
accepted accounting principles." Furthermore, the
consolidation of the shipbuilding financial data into the
corporate reports obscures the situation even further.
For instance, most major shipyard conglomerates use the
pooling-of-interest method of accounting, whereby in a
merger, the asset values of the acquired shipyard are
"pooled" with the conglomerate assets at book value. This
method provides an advantage in that the asset values
subject to a write-off against income are minimized, and
the future earnings performance is enhanced. Also, the
case of accounting for claims has been mentioned
previously. The general availability of conglomerate
shipbuilding financial data has been improved somewhat






Review of the United States shipbuilding industry and
influences of conglomerates presented in this study has led
the author to the following conclusions:
1. The U.S. shipbuilding industry has played an
important role in the history of America since pre-revolutionary
times. Although its development has been affected by American
and world economic conditions, the single most influential
factor in shaping the industry has been the U.S. Government.
The primary elements of this government influence are
maritime legislation and Navy procurement policies.
Maritime legislative policies and requirements are
administered primarily by the Maritime Administration. The
most important of the legislative policies and programs is
the Construction-Differential Subsidy (CDS) program, which
derives from the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and seeks to
improve parity between the United States and world ship
construction costs. In 1970 the CDS program was modified
to further stimulate American shipbuilding.
Three Navy ship acquisition policies are evident from
the last twenty-five years. Many features of the Total
Package Procurement policies of the 1962-1969 era have
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developed into serious problem areas for the 1970s. The
present policy seeks to learn from these lessons and move
forward with an improved Navy shipbuilding program.
2. United States shipbuilding can be divided into
two fairly distinct market sectors of merchant and naval
shipbuilding. Merchant shipbuilding alone is not a major
influence on world shipbuilding; however, considered with
the extensive naval shipbuilding program, the United States
must be ranked with Japan and the U.S.S.R. as the leading
world shipbuilding nations. Even so, the U.S. shipbuilding
market has been effectively isolated from the rest of the
world by the U.S. /foreign construction cost differential
and the requirements of federal legislation. The merchant
shipbuilding sector represents approximately one-half of
the number and 90% of the tonnage, but only one-third of
the value of present construction; is dominated by four
major producers; and is directed primarily towards tanker
construction. The naval shipbuilding sector, which
represents about two-thirds of the value of ship
construction, is supplied by only six of the fourteen major
shipyards, but is clearly dominated by three major builders.
Taken as a whole, U.S. shipbuilding can be viewed as
oligopolistic in terms of the major producers of merchant
and Naval vessels and monopsonistic in terms of the major
customer in the market, the U.S. Government.
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3. Through five major periods of merger activity since
1879, conglomeration has become an important means of
diversified business growth since the late 1960s. The recent
period of heightened merger activity has greatly changed
the corporate structure of the shipbuilding industry since
1959. Most notable in this has been the entrance of
conglomerate firms into the industry. It is felt that two
major factors which drew the conglomerates into the industry
were financial difficulty of shipyards and the payment
policies of the Navy shipbuilding at the time. (Other more
specific reasons are explored in the study.) Presently, of
the twelve major shipbuilding corporations, six can be
classified as conglomerates and only one (Todd Shipyards)
as an independent shipbuilder. For most of the shipbuilding
parent corporations, shipbuilding constitutes only a small
share of the total business activity. Also, from their
dominating market share position, it is evident that the
conglomerate firms are in a position to greatly influence
the total shipbuilding industry.
4. Six major areas of conglomerate influence on the
U.S. shipbuilding industry were identified: facility
expansion and modernization programs, organizational
structure, management philosophy and expertise, Navy
shipbuilding claims, power and influence, and financial
reporting.
(a) The presence of large corporations in the shipbuilding
industry has afforded a greater capability for the industry

191
to keep pace with its changing market and technology.
However, it is suggested that conglomeration has brought
greater flexibility into facility investment programs through
not only a large financial base, as other large corporations,
but also through their widely diversified nature. The
evidence indicates that the conglomerate-controlled
shipyards have been better able to undertake large
facility expansion and modernization programs, and to
maintain such programs in the face of adverse economic
conditions. Additionally, they have exercised a
flexibility in market strategy through facilities
expansion to gain large shares in both merchant and naval
shipbuilding, rather than in just one market sector,
(b) The acquired shipyards have undergone the characteristic
change in its organizational structure from that of an
independent business entity to that of division of a
corporation. This is true for both corporate and
conglomerate acquisitions; however, it is felt to be more
significant for the conglomerate acquisitions because,
generally, the acquired firm becomes a lower-level segment.
This can have several manifestations. Additional levels
are placed in the decisionmaking process which can tend to
encumber and delay shipyard executive decisionmaking and
may, in effect, take the shipbuilding out of the hands of
the shipbuilder. Absentee corporate top management may
be less aware of, and sensitive to, local circumstances
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of both an intra-shipyard and a community nature. Also,
addition of conglomerate hierarchy has seemed to induce a
higher level of management relationship in Naval shipbuilding
(more so than for the corporations) in that relationships
which had generally been between the shipbuilder and the
Navy Supervisor of Shipbuilding have tended to rise to
higher levels in both the conglomerate management and the
Navy and Department of Defense.
(c) Other characteristic changes have occurred in the
management philosophy and expertise of conglomerate-acquired
shipyards. In some cases, shipyard technical management
has been replaced by management-oriented managers from the
conglomerate parent. Some have brought new and sophisticated
management techniques. There has been some impact upon the
prevalent shipbuilding parochialism. Also, management
philosophies have shifted to a greater financial status
and profit orientation. The changes in the overall shipyard
management attitudes, philosophies and orientations have
impacted upon the shipyards' relationships with their
customers. It appears that this impact has been much less
disruptive in the commercial market than in the Naval
shipbuilding market.
(d) The conglomerates have been involved in the issue of
Navy shipbuilding claims since its escalation in 1967,
primarily due to the development of the claims problem
during a period in which conglomerate-controlled shipyards

193
have become increasingly dominant in the shipbuilding
industry, and that the conglomerate-controlled shipbuilders
have accounted for an extremely large share of the claims
submitted. Based upon available data, the author
concludes that this relationship is not one of cause-and-
effect, and that conglomeration in the U.S. shipbuilding
industry was not a primary motivating force for the recent
claims problem. A contributing and possibly aggravating
influence is felt to exist, however, in an apparently
greater propensity of the conglomerate-controlled shipyards
to exercise claims due to a greater resource base of both
manpower and financing, and their high financial priorities.
This is to say that it appears that the conglomerates are
more ready, willing, and able to prosecute claims. Also,
it is felt that the apparent leadership of such firms in
prosecuting claims against the government has contributed
to claims activity of other shipbuilders,
(e) The conglomerates have gained power and influence
within the shipbuilding industry because of their number,
market shares and shipbuilding capabilities. They have
potentially the power to affect many aspects important to
the industry, such as Maritime Administration subsidy
policy, Navy procurement policies and decisions, claims
settlements, internal Department of Defense relations, and
other political and business matters. Their leverage may
predominantly reflect their own self-interests, but it also
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may increase the influence of the industry as a
whole.
(f) Financial reporting of the shipyards have been absorbed
into the reports for the acquiring corporations. This has
significantly reduced the financial data available for
examination and cannot be restricted to just conglomerates.
By intent, this study has been limited in scope to
shipyards capable of new construction of Naval ships, such
as destroyers and larger, and oceangoing merchant vessels
longer than 47 5 feet, and based upon data and resource
material which is generally available, rather than
confidential or proprietary information. Further
investigation of the influences of conglomerates on the
shipbuilding industry are recommended in the following
areas:
1. Detailed financial analysis of the performance
of conglomerates in the shipbuilding industry. Such
studies have been performed for other industries, and
this will require access to confidential corporate
financial data.
2. Examination on site of the impact of conglomerates
on organizational structure and internal operations of the
acquired shipyards. This can be compared with that for
the corporate-controlled and independent shipyards.
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3. Examination of the shipbuilding market strategies
of the large corporations, conglomerates and the independent,
to determine the extent to which the industry strategy is
determined by the conglomerates, or vice versa.
4. Examination of the shipbuilding technology employed
by the conglomerate-controlled shipyards to determine the
extent, if any, to which they have achieved advantages or
enhanced overall industry technology levels.
5. Investigation of the extent to which conglomerates
have been able to achieve economies of scale in the industry.
6. Review of the Navy managerial, political, and legal
policies to determine shipbuilding policy changes appropriate
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